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Article 
Everything Radiates: Does the Fourth Amendment 
Regulate Side-Channel Cryptanalysis? 
RIANA PFEFFERKORN 
Encryption shields private information from malicious eavesdroppers. After 
years of slow adoption, encryption is finally becoming widespread in consumer-
oriented electronic devices and communications services. Consumer-oriented 
encryption software is now more user-friendly, and much of it turns on encryption 
by default. These advances enhance privacy and security for millions of people. 
However, encryption also poses an impediment to law enforcement’s ability to 
gather electronic evidence. Law enforcement calls this the “going dark” problem. 
U.S. law enforcement agencies have responded through both legal and 
technological means to encryption’s perceived threat to their capabilities. The 
scope of encryption’s impact on those capabilities is not yet clear, and police still 
have a wealth of data and technical tools at their disposal. Nevertheless, 
sophisticated criminals can use encryption to stymie investigators, forcing them to 
resort to resource-intensive, tailored measures to investigate those individuals. 
One means of doing so is through a “side-channel attack.” Our electronic 
devices are always radiating something—electromagnetic emissions, heat, and so 
forth. Those emissions reveal information, called “side channel information,” 
about the device. The physical implementation of a cryptosystem leaks 
electromagnetic emissions from which academic researchers have shown it is 
possible to extract the system’s secret encryption keys. Side-channel cryptanalysis 
is not a known law enforcement tactic at present, but that may change in time.  
Law enforcement use of side-channel attacks will raise Fourth Amendment 
issues that will require a fact-intensive analysis to resolve. In determining what 
legal process (if any) will authorize a side-channel attack, a court will have to 
carefully examine what information will be acquired, from where, and how. The 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not provide clear, 
predictable guidance for those inquiries. Its decision in Kyllo v. United States 
supplies the touchstone for the legal analysis of side-channel attacks. However, 
the Court’s current framework for electronic surveillance cannot adequately 
safeguard Americans’ privacy interests from erosion by technological advances. 
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Everything Radiates: Does the Fourth Amendment 
Regulate Side-Channel Cryptanalysis? 
RIANA PFEFFERKORN* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Everything vibrates.”1 Actually, “everything radiate[s].”2 Every 
physical implementation of a cryptosystem leaks something—
electromagnetic radiation, power consumption, sound, or some other 
emission. Those leakages can be measured, and those measurements reveal 
information—likely against the cryptosystem user’s wishes and without 
her knowledge. 
In cryptography, these sources of indirect information are called side 
channels. A side-channel attack on a cryptosystem seeks to gain 
information from physical leakages, rather than by other, more direct 
methods of cryptanalysis.  
At present, side-channel attacks are (to our knowledge) the business of 
America’s military and intelligence agencies, not its police. They are 
typically complex and resource-intensive, limiting their feasibility for law 
enforcement use. That said, such attacks have become more affordable 
over time, and technologies that originated in military and intelligence use 
have a tendency to trickle down to garden-variety police departments. 
Meanwhile, as commercially-available, relatively easy-to-use encryption 
software gains widespread favor among Americans, law enforcement 
officials have been exploring options for circumventing encryption to gain 
access to data and communications in intelligible form. In time, law 
enforcement may seek to resort to certain types of side-channel attack to 
gather information after exhausting other means of investigating a 
sophisticated, high-value target.  
                                                                                                                          
* Cryptography Fellow, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. Thank you to 
Chantelle Ankerman and the staff of the Connecticut Law Review for inviting me to participate in the 
Connecticut Law Review’s January 2017 Symposium and publish in its corresponding Symposium 
issue. Many thanks also to Jennifer Granick, Josh Myer, and Brian Pascal for their helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article. Any remaining errors are my own. 
1 See Dahlia Lithwick, Everything Vibrates, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2008, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2008/11/everything_vibrat
es.html [https://perma.cc/R8YM-JB44] (discussing a delightful aphorism of the Summum religious 
organization); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 465 n.1, 466 (2009) (featuring 
a discussion of the Seven Aphorisms of the Summum in the context of an Establishment Clause case).  
2 Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book I: The 
Struggle for Centralization, 1945-1960, in 5 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY 221 (1995). 
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When that time comes, investigators will have to consider whether the 
Fourth Amendment regulates their gathering of side-channel information.3 
Do the police need a warrant to obtain information about a target through a 
side-channel attack? That’s the question this Article seeks to answer. The 
conclusion: It depends. 
I. WHAT IS SIDE-CHANNEL CRYPTANALYSIS? 
Cryptography is the discipline of protecting secrets4 through coded 
writing.5 Encryption is “the transformation of data into a form that is as 
close to impossible as possible to read without the appropriate knowledge . 
. . [namely,] []a key.”6 An encryption algorithm turns human-readable 
language (“plaintext”) into an unintelligible scramble (“ciphertext”) that 
ostensibly can only be decoded using a decryption key.7 Encryption keeps 
the encoded information secret from anyone who is not intended to have 
access to it, even if that person has access to the ciphertext.8  
Cryptanalysis is “the flip-side of cryptography:”9 the study of code-
breaking.10 There are a number of different methods of modern 
cryptanalysis. One class of techniques exploits weaknesses in the 
encryption algorithm. For example, an algorithm may produce seemingly 
random ciphertext that in fact contains patterns which the attacker 
                                                                                                                          
3 The Fourth Amendment’s constraints on intelligence activities—as opposed to domestic law 
enforcement—are beyond the scope of this Article. 
4 See RSA Laboratories, 1.2 What is Cryptography?, DELLEMC, https://singapore.emc.com/emc-
plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-cryptography.htm [https://perma.cc/L9TW-JJVA] (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter What is Cryptography?] (“To most people, cryptography is concerned 
with keeping communications private.”); see also ALFRED J. MENEZES ET AL., HANDBOOK OF APPLIED 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 1 (1996) [hereinafter HAC] (indicating that cryptography is a tool for protecting 
“secrets and strategies”). 
5 Cryptography, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45374 
[https://perma.cc/3QMD-7YCJ ] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
6 What is Cryptography?, supra note 4; see also Datatreasury Corp. v. Ingenico S.A., No. 02-cv-
95, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31457, at *68 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2004) (defining “encrypt” to mean “the 
transformation of data into a form unreadable by anyone without a secret decryption key. Its purpose is 
to ensure privacy by keeping the information hidden from anyone for whom it is not intended.”); Ryan 
Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 37 (2016) (defining encryption as 
“the process of rendering communications unreadable to anyone but the recipient”). Note, however, 
that Professor Calo’s definition does not encompass the encryption of stored data, such as files on a 
laptop. 
7 What is Cryptography?, supra note 4; see also Steven M. Bellovin, INTRODUCTION TO 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 4 (2016) [hereinafter BELLOVIN, INTRO], https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/
classes/f16/l_crypt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSV3-JKPN] (providing certain materials for lecture in 
COMS W4180 Network Security course at Columbia University). 
8 What is Cryptography?, supra note 4. 
9 RSA Laboratories, 2.4.1 What Is Cryptanalysis?, DELLEMC, https://www.emc.com/emc-
plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-cryptanalysis.htm [https://perma.cc/RH48-VYQB] (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
10 Id. 
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(“cryptanalyst”) can analyze to crack the secret code.11  
Another class of techniques, called side-channel attacks, gains 
information about the targeted cryptosystem12 by exploiting weaknesses in 
its physical implementation.13 Side-channel cryptanalysis works by 
measuring information that the physical implementation of the 
cryptosystem emits through side channels.14 Side-channel information 
includes motion,15 sound emitted during a computation,16 a device’s 
                                                                                                                          
11 For example, an attacker can apply “frequency analysis” to ciphertext, checking which letters 
occur most often; she guesses that they correspond to the most frequent letters in English (assuming the 
plaintext is in English), and guesses the rest of the letters from there. Simon Singh, Letter Frequencies, 
SIMONSINGH, http://www.simonsingh.net/The_Black_Chamber/letterfrequencies.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZER4-JDMU] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
12 A cryptosystem “is a general term referring to a set of cryptographic primitive[] [tools] used to 
provide information security services. Most often the term is used in conjunction with primitives 
providing confidentiality, i.e., encryption.” HAC, supra note 4, at 15. Put more simply, “[a] 
cryptosystem is pair of algorithms that take a key and . . . convert plaintext to ciphertext and back.” 
BELLOVIN, INTRO, supra note 7, at 4. 
13 FRANÇOIS KOEUNE ET AL., A TUTORIAL ON PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SIDE-CHANNEL 
ATTACKS, in FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN III 78–108 (2005) [hereinafter 
KOEUNE]. 
14 See Dan Goodin, New Attack Steals E-Mail Decryption Keys by Capturing Computer Sounds, 
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/new-attack-steals-
e-mail-decryption-keys-by-capturing-computer-sounds/ [https://perma.cc/YG6U-H28T] 
(“[C]ryptanalytic side-channel attacks . . . target cryptographic implementations that leak secret 
information through power consumption, electromagnetic emanations, timing differences, or other 
indirect channels.”). 
15 See, e.g., LIANG CAI & HAO CHEN, TOUCHLOGGER: INFERRING KEYSTROKES ON TOUCH 
SCREEN FROM SMARTPHONE MOTION 1 (2011) [hereinafter TOUCHLOGGER], https://www.usenix.org/
legacy/event/hotsec11/tech/final_files/Cai.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8Q7-55V3] (describing how it is 
possible to log keystrokes on smartphones with touchscreens, due to the fact that “keystroke 
vibration[s] on touch screens are highly correlated to the keys being typed”) (paper delivered at 6th 
Usenix Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec’11)); see also Zhi Xu ET AL., TAPLOGGER: 
INFERRING USER INPUTS ON SMARTPHONE TOUCHSCREENS USING ON-BOARD MOTION SENSORS 2 
(2012), http://www.cse.psu.edu/~sxz16/papers/taplogger.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MCA-3AZD] 
[hereinafter TAPLOGGER] (indicating that keystrokes can be inferred through motion sensor data) 
(paper delivered at the Fifth ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (WiSec 2012)). Both of 
these publications assume that the smartphone’s user installs malware that reads the data from the 
phone’s motion sensors and transmits it back to the attacker, i.e., that the side-channel information is 
being measured directly from the device, not remotely. Similarly, recent research demonstrated an in-
browser JavaScript-based side channel attack (i.e., no app download needed) that can infer user PINs 
with high accuracy using side-channel information from a mobile device’s motion and orientation 
sensors. MARYAM MEHRNEZHAD ET AL., STEALING PINS VIA MOBILE SENSORS: ACTUAL RISK VERSUS 
USER PERCEPTION (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.05549v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8DL-LN7C] 
[hereinafter STEALING PINS].  
16 See, e.g., Adi Shamir & Eran Tromer, Acoustic Cryptanalysis: On Nosy People and Noisy 
Machines, https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ec04rump/ [https://perma.cc/TAV3-5Z84] (May 4, 
2004) (materials presented at the Eurocrypt 2004 rump session in Interlaken, Switzerland) (describing 
how a CPU in the midst of particular computations may create auditory signatures that could be used to 
decrypt secret keys). 
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electromagnetic (EM) emissions,17 cryptographic hardware’s power 
consumption,18 and the time it takes a computer to execute a cryptographic 
algorithm,19 to name a few examples.  
One goal of cryptanalysis is for the cryptanalyst to determine the 
cryptosystem’s secret key.20 The keys to encrypt devices and 
communications differ. The keys to encrypt a device reside on the device 
and do not leave it.21 For the encryption of communications, the keys to 
encrypt a particular communication (“session keys”) are exchanged 
between the two parties, but each party’s long-term identity key (which lets 
the parties prove their identities to each other) stays on the device.22  
A side-channel attack that allows the attacker to obtain the 
cryptosystem’s secret encryption key is called a key-recovery attack23 or 
                                                                                                                          
17 See, e.g., KOEUNE, supra note 13. In 1985, Wim van Eck was the first to publish an 
unclassified technical paper on EM side-channel attacks, specifically focusing on attacks against 
computer monitors. See Wim van Eck, Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An 
Eavesdropping Risk?, 4 COMPUT. & SEC. 269, 270 (1985) (discussing how it is “possible to reconstruct 
the picture displayed on [a] video display unit from the radiated emission”). EM side-channel attacks 
are therefore also called “van Eck phreaking,” though the term properly refers only to EM side-channel 
attacks to reproduce the display of a monitor. CRAIG BAUER, SECRET HISTORY: THE STORY OF 
CRYPTOLOGY 344 (2013). 
18 See, e.g., Paul Kocher et al., Differential Power Analysis, 1999 INT’L ADVANCES IN 
CRYPTOLOGY CONF. 2 (discussing SPA, a technique for collecting information about a device’s 
cryptographic operations by directly interpreting power consumption measurements). 
19 See, e.g., Paul C. Kocher, Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and 
Other Systems, ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY – CRYPTO ’96 112–13 (1996) (available at 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F3-540-68697-5_9.pdf) (“Implementation-specific 
timing characteristics . . . can sometimes be used to compromise secret keys.”). 
20 See JEAN-PHILIPPE AUMASSON, CRYPTANALYSIS VS. REALITY 1 (2011), 
https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-11/Aumasson/bh-ad-11-Aumasson-CryptanalysisVSReality_WP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DQ5Z-8SY2] (white paper delivered at the Black Hat Abu Dhabi 2011 conference).  
21 See EDWARD W. FELTEN, NUTS AND BOLTS OF ENCRYPTION: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 
1–3 (2017), https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/encryption_primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6KC-
M788].  
22 Id. at 3–4; see also, e.g., WHATSAPP, WHATSAPP ENCRYPTION OVERVIEW 4 (2016), 
https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QBY-
45TQ] (“At no time does the WhatsApp server have access to any of the client’s private keys.”); Greg 
Kumparak, Apple Explains Exactly How Secure iMessage Really Is, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2014), 
https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/apple-explains-exactly-how-secure-imessage-really-is/ 
[https://perma.cc/E67K-S8XH] (explaining public/private key pairs in Apple iMessage and noting, 
“Your private keys are stored on your device. Apple never sees your private keys.”); Digitally Signing 
and Encrypting Messages – Mozilla Support, MOZILLA, https://support.mozilla.org/t5/Privacy-and-
security-settings/Digitally-Signing-and-Encrypting-Messages/ta-p/16330 [https://perma.cc/3ZKF-
M2PG] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (explaining public-key cryptographic system used to encrypt email 
messages and cautioning, “Never share your private key with anyone”); Rob Heaton, How Does 
HTTPS Actually Work?, ROBERTHEATON (Mar. 27, 2014), http://robertheaton.com/2014/03/27/how-
does-https-actually-work/ [https://perma.cc/6R9D-8NW6] (explaining how web traffic is secured, 
including public/private key pairs). 
23 Key-Recovery Attack, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key-recovery_attack (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
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key-extraction attack.24 This Article focuses on electromagnetic side-
channel key-recovery attacks.25 In recent years, researchers “have 
demonstrated that they can re[c]over the keys from the major types of 
public key encryption in use today simply by picking up the radio waves 
emanating from your laptop.”26 The Article examines whether law 
enforcement can take advantage of that capability without legal process. 
The latest public research on side-channel cryptanalysis has its roots in 
World War II and the early Cold War era. During the war, the military 
bought encryption devices that turned out to leak EM emissions that 
allowed the recovery of plaintext from eighty feet away.27 In the 1950s, the 
newly-created National Security Agency (NSA) tested its equipment and 
realized that all of it radiated EM emissions.28 The agency took defensive 
countermeasures and set specifications for shielding equipment from 
spying.29 These so-called TEMPEST attacks are low-cost to conduct,30 but 
expensive to defend against, as they are “non-trivial . . . and can require a 
lot of special equipment.”31 Military standards for equipment shielding are 
largely classified, which limits the academic and private sectors’ 
                                                                                                                          
24 See Michael Byrne, PC Hardware Is Physically Leaking Your Encryption Keys, VICE: 
MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2016, 9:14 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pc-hardware-is-
physically-leaking-your-encryption-keys [https://perma.cc/U39F-VLCL] (using the term “key 
extraction” synonymously with key recovery). 
25 While this Article focuses on key-recovery attacks, the author hopes it provides a framework 
for thinking through Fourth Amendment issues with respect to other varieties of side-channel attack as 
well. 
26 Alan Woodward, Crypto Key Recovery: Through Walls in Seconds, CYBER MATTERS (Feb. 15, 
2016), https://www.profwoodward.org/2016/02/crypto-key-recovery-through-walls-in.html [https://
perma.cc/2VJ9-DF88]. For an overview of public-key cryptography, see Martin E. Hellman, An 
Overview of Public Key Cryptography, IEEE COMMS. SOC’Y MAG., November 1978, at 24, 24–32, 
https://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/31.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W97-3QUW] (discussing 
the main purposes and challenges facing cryptography).  
27 NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, TEMPEST: A SIGNAL PROBLEM 27 (2007), https://www.nsa.gov/news-
features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/assets/files/tempest.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ4K-
DAUH].  
28 Johnson, supra note 2, at 221. 
29 See BAUER, supra note 17, at 343 (“[V]arious countermeasures were taken to minimize the 
distance at which emanations could be measured to reveal information.”). The countermeasures are 
called TEMPEST (Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard), and while the term 
technically refers only to defensive measures, side-channel attacks that exploit EM emanations are 
commonly called “TEMPEST attacks.” Id.  
30 van Eck, supra note 17, at 270. The attack van Eck described, against a cathode-ray tube (CRT) 
monitor, required only a TV set and about $15 in additional equipment. Id. A more recent attack 
against a liquid-crystal display (LCD) monitor allegedly cost less than $2,000 in equipment. See 
BAUER, supra note 17, at 344 (citing Markus G. Kuhn, ELECTROMAGNETIC EAVESDROPPING RISKS OF 
FLAT-PANEL DISPLAYS 23–25 (2004) [hereinafter Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks], 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7ZF-J387] (paper presented at 
4th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Toronto, Can.). 
31 BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 220 
(2000). 
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opportunities to come up with low-cost countermeasures.32 
Part of what makes TEMPEST attacks so costly to defend against is 
that the issue affects all kinds of electronic equipment. Since “everything 
radiate[s]” electromagnetic emissions,33 EM side-channel attacks are not 
limited to monitors. “[E]verything leaks to some degree,” be it cell phones, 
fax machines, computer switches, cables, power lines,34 or keyboards.35  
EM side-channel attacks, while powerful, are currently of limited 
utility “in the field.” A major concern for anyone conducting a side-
channel attack is being discovered by the target. The attacker must not be 
detected—or at least, the target must not realize the attack is happening. 
Because they involve measuring physical outputs such as EM emissions or 
sound, side-channel attacks typically require placing the attacker’s sensing 
equipment in close physical proximity to the system being attacked.36  
EM attacks on monitors can work at enough of a distance to quell a 
would-be attacker’s fears: hundreds of meters for old CRT monitors,37 and 
ten38 to thirty meters39 for newer flat-screen displays. 
                                                                                                                          
32 MARKUS G. KUHN, COMPROMISING EMANATIONS: EAVESDROPPING RISKS OF COMPUTER 
DISPLAYS 85–86 (2003), https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-577.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HJ7C-74A3] (“Secret ‘Tempest’ specification will not enjoy the continued quality 
assurance offered by public scrutiny and open academic research. Such peer review and feedback has 
led in the past repeatedly to significant improvements of technical standards, for example, in 
cryptology, even where open research initially lags a decade or two behind the classified state of the 
art.”).  
33 Johnson, supra note 2, at 221. 
34 SCHNEIER, supra note 31, at 220. 
35 See Martin Vuagnoux & Sylvain Pasini, Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired 
and Wireless Keyboards 1 (2009), https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec09/tech/full_papers/
vuagnoux.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HH3-3KRJ] (explaining that EM side-channel attacks on wired and 
wireless keyboards allowed researchers to recover up to 95% of the keystrokes entered, meaning that 
most modern computer keyboards “are not safe to transmit confidential information,” such as 
passwords) (paper presented at 18th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium in Montreal, Can.). 
36 See KUHN, supra note 32, at 133 (“Eavesdropping on unintended hardware emissions usually 
requires a physical presence close to the target. This can lead to significant cost and risk of discovery 
for the eavesdropper.”). Of course, proximity is unnecessary if the target transmits side-channel data 
directly to the attacker—such as where the attacker can get the target to download and run malicious 
code on an electronic device that “phones home” to the attacker with the data. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. The legal requirements for law enforcement to do this are beyond the scope of this 
Article. See infra notes 129, 133 and accompanying text.  
37 van Eck, supra note 17, at 270–71 (stating that it is not possible to decrease the radiation from 
the electron beam in the CRT). 
38 See ELECTROMAGNETIC EAVESDROPPING RISKS, supra note 30, at 8 fig.3 (illustrating that text 
is readable from ten meters away); see also Tom Simonite, Seeing Through Walls, NEW SCIENTIST 
(Apr. 20, 2007, 6:59 PM), https://www.newscientist.com/blog/technology/2007/04/seeing-through-
walls.html [https://perma.cc/75VC-EKEY] (stating that Professor Kuhn reported successfully seeing 
flat-panel displays from up to twenty-five meters away and claimed that he “was able to eavesdrop [on] 
certain laptops through three walls”). 
39 Michael Backes ET AL., COMPROMISING REFLECTIONS—OR—HOW TO READ LCD MONITORS 
AROUND THE CORNER 1 (2008), http://gauss.ececs.uc.edu/Courses/c653/extra/reflections.pdf 
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Side-channel key-extraction attacks in particular, however, typically 
require far greater proximity. One recent EM key-extraction attack cleverly 
fits the sensing equipment inside a piece of pita bread, but the attack is 
effective only at distances of twenty centimeters to half a meter.40 The 
same researchers also demonstrated an acoustic key-extraction attack 
against laptops that works at a distance of four meters, so long as the 
attacker uses a parabolic microphone; the attack can also be accomplished 
using just a mobile phone, but with an effective distance of only thirty 
centimeters.41 Likewise, the same team’s recently-published 
electromagnetic key-extraction attack against an Apple iPhone required 
“placing a magnetic probe in the proximity of the device.”42  
The same (eerily prolific) team recently demonstrated an EM key-
extraction attack against laptops that works by measuring, through a wall, 
the EM leakage of a target laptop located in an adjacent room.43 The attack 
still requires proximity,44 but the wall provides coverage for the attacker 
(and any conspicuous equipment) from discovery by the target.  
TEMPEST-style attacks on displays may be more practical than other 
varieties of electromagnetic side-channel attack,45 but key-recovery attacks 
have their advantages. A TEMPEST attack, though feasible at greater 
                                                                                                                          
[https://perma.cc/GWH2-J3D8] (paper presented at 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy in 
Oakland, Cal.). 
40 DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., STEALING KEYS FROM PCS USING A RADIO: CHEAP 
ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACKS ON WINDOWED EXPONENTIATION 14, 23 (2015) [hereinafter STEALING 
KEYS FROM PCS], https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/radioexp.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA96-F327]. 
41 DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., RSA KEY EXTRACTION VIA LOW-BANDWIDTH ACOUSTIC 
CRYPTANALYSIS 11–12, 27 (2014) [hereinafter RSA KEY EXTRACTION], 
https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/acoustic-20131218.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SH5-G9FP]. To 
successfully conduct a key-extraction attack using a mobile phone that is limited to this thirty-
centimeter range, the researchers envision a scenario wherein the attacker could “innocuously place his 
phone on the desk next to the target laptop” during a meeting between target and attacker, “and obtain 
the key by the meeting’s end.” Id. at 5–6, 27. It could pose a challenge for law enforcement agents to 
carry out an “innocuous” encounter like this so close to a target, though it is not impossible. 
42 DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., ECDSA KEY EXTRACTION FROM MOBILE DEVICES VIA NONINTRUSIVE 
PHYSICAL SIDE CHANNELS 2 (2016) [hereinafter ECDSA KEY EXTRACTION], 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/230.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8FX-A2YY]. The team taped the probe to the 
underside of a glass table atop which the iPhone was sitting. Id. at 3. 
43 DANIEL GENKIN ET AL., ECDH KEY-EXTRACTION VIA LOW-BANDWIDTH ELECTROMAGNETIC 
ATTACKS ON PCS 11 (2016) [hereinafter ECDH KEY-EXTRACTION], 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHW2-F43N]. The researchers were able “to 
extract the whole secret key by monitoring the target’s electromagnetic (EM) field for just a few 
seconds.” Id. at 2. 
44 See id. at 11 (explaining that the sensing equipment is placed right on the opposite side of the 
wall from the laptop, preferably closest to the spot on the laptop that yields the best signal quality). 
45 See KUHN, supra note 32, at 133 (“Compared to the large number of minor and highly 
theoretical vulnerabilities of cryptographic primitives and protocols discussed in much of the current 
computer security literature, compromising emanations are a risk of practical interest . . . .”). 
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distances,46 only lets the attacker “see” whatever the target happens to 
display on his monitor. Obtaining the target’s secret encryption keys 
unlocks the door to a much greater cache of information.  
In sum, side-channel key-recovery attacks can be a powerful way to 
circumvent a target’s use of encryption and gain access to his records in 
plaintext. However, they will remain limited in investigatory utility until 
they can work at greater distances and with discreet equipment. The next 
Section discusses why law enforcement may nevertheless need to deploy 
such attacks in the future, regardless of their drawbacks. 
II. ENCRYPTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
A. Encryption Is Growing in Popular Use (at Last) 
Encryption started out being too important to let just anybody use it. 
But in the digital age, it has become too important for anybody not to use 
it. We rely on encryption to secure our communications,47 medical records, 
banking records, financial transactions,48 business secrets, intellectual 
property, and national security.49 Nowadays, just about everybody gets to 
have encryption, and consumer-oriented encryption software is finally 
making some progress in overcoming its longstanding usability problems.  
Secret writing50 goes back centuries, yet despite its long and 
distinguished history in warfare, intelligence,51 and statecraft,52 
                                                                                                                          
46 See ELECTROMAGNETIC EAVESDROPPING RISKS, supra note 30, at 8 fig.3 (stating that text is 
readable from ten meters away through three walls).  
47 See Easy Guide to Encryption and Why It Matters, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 21, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/10/easy-guide-to-encryption-and-why-it-matters/ 
[https://perma.cc/H9EM-XLQL] (stating that people use encryption to prevent their text messages, 
emails, phone calls, and video chats from being accessed by people other than the intended recipient). 
48 Ann Cavoukian, Encryption Is Crucial to Our Privacy and Freedom, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 9, 
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/encryption-is-crucial-to-our-privacy-and-
freedom/article27652852/ [https://perma.cc/2EMB-HQLK]. 
49 Susan Landau, The National-Security Needs for Ubiquitous Encryption, in BERKMAN CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. UNIV., DON’T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” 
DEBATE app. A 1–3 (2016). 
50 See Cryptography, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
cryptography [https://perma.cc/ZL6H-8NB6] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (“The word traces back to the 
Greek roots kryptos, meaning ‘hidden,’ and graphein, meaning ‘to write.’”); Cryptography, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45374 [https://perma.cc/Y55W-YPF3] (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
51 The Allies’ compromise of both the Nazis’ and Japanese’s encryption schemes played an 
important role in the outcome of World War II. See Thinh Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls, 
and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
667, 668 (1997) (explaining how breaking the Enigma code helped the Allies sink German U-boats and 
obtain information about military operations, and similar code-breaking helped the United States Navy 
intercept the Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway).  
52 Julius Caesar used a cipher to protect his confidential writings. See SUETONIUS, THE CAESARS 
100 (Donna W. Hurley trans., 2011) (“And whenever he writes in code, he substitutes B for A, C for B, 
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cryptography has only come into widespread use by laypeople relatively 
recently. For many years, the NSA jealously guarded all information about 
crypto and hindered its dissemination in the civilian sphere.53 That changed 
with the rise of the Internet in the late twentieth century, following a 
pitched battle in the courts and Congress. The history of the so-called 
“Crypto Wars” of the 1990s has been amply documented already and need 
not be revisited here.54 Suffice it to say that as of this writing, in the United 
States, it is legal as a general matter to teach cryptography55 and to sell 
encryption software and cryptographic equipment (albeit with some 
restrictions on exports).56  
It took a while for average Americans to show much enthusiasm for 
this hard-won outcome. But they cannot be faulted for that. Encryption has 
contributed for years to the ongoing tension between security and 
usability.57 Commercial, off-the-shelf encryption software has long been 
notoriously user-unfriendly,58 difficult to configure properly, and clunky to 
                                                                                                                          
and the rest of the letters that follow in the same plan.”). Also, the Founding Fathers encoded their 
letters discussing an early draft of the First Amendment. See John A. Fraser, III, The Use of Encrypted, 
Coded and Secret Communications Is an “Ancient Liberty” Protected by the United States 
Constitution, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (1997) (describing how correspondence between Jefferson and 
Madison concerning comments to the First Amendment consisted of partially enciphered text). 
53 STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT—SAVING PRIVACY 
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 13–15 (2001) (describing how “all the salient information about modern crypto 
was withheld from public view” by the shadowy NSA, which “considered itself the sole repository of 
cryptographic information in the country—not just that used by the civilian government and all the 
armed forces, . . . but that used by the private sector as well”). 
54 Id. This source is an excellent, readable account of the Crypto Wars that is accessible to those 
without a mathematical or scientific background (such as the author, and the non-negligible segment of 
the legal community that decided to go to law school because there is no math on the LSAT). 
55 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (challenging then-current export 
restrictions on encryption software, likewise holding encryption software source code to be First 
Amendment-protected speech, in case brought by a professor who wished to disseminate encryption 
software source code as part of a course on computers and the law); see also Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling, in narrow holding, that software source code is speech 
protected by the First Amendment, and that government regulations unconstitutionally prevented 
publication of cryptographic source code which plaintiff Daniel Bernstein wanted to publish while a 
student at the University of California, Berkeley), reh’g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
56 Commerce Control List, 82 Fed. Reg. 38769, 38799–802 (Aug. 15, 2017) (to be codified at 15 
C.F.R. § 774.1). 
57 See, e.g., SCOTT RUOTI ET AL., WHY JOHNNY STILL, STILL CAN’T ENCRYPT: EVALUATING THE 
USABILITY OF A MODERN PGP CLIENT (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1510.08555v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KF5-C4CY] (reporting results of a usability study of the encrypted email client 
Mailvelope, with the majority of study participants finding it difficult to use and almost none of the 
participants being able to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them, thus leading to the 
conclusion that “[u]sable, secure email is still an open problem more than 15 years after it was first 
studied”). 
58 “For encryption to help most citizens, it has to be usable. It often is not.” Calo, supra note 6, at 
37. See, e.g., Alma Whitten & J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 
5.0, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN USE 679, 699 
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use.59 Unsurprisingly, because “encryption was typically cumbersome” in 
the past, “its use [was] rare.”60 
In recent years, developers have finally started to make “usable 
security” a visible priority. Companies such as Apple, Facebook, and 
Google have implemented strong encryption into their products and 
services, in some instances turning encryption features on by default.61 
“Defaulting to encryption” is preferable to making users configure their 
settings, because “something that is already turned on need not be usable, 
and most people stick with defaults, making encryption widespread.”62 
For communications security, Apple uses default “end-to-end” 
encryption in its iMessage messaging app and FaceTime video call app,63 
meaning the two interlocutors can read the messages they exchange, but 
eavesdroppers cannot read any intercepted plaintext—and neither can 
Apple.64 Open Whisper Systems’ free Signal app for text messages and 
voice calls is also end-to-end encrypted by default.65 Facebook-owned 
WhatsApp now uses Signal’s encryption protocol to encrypt messages, 
voice calls, and video calls end-to-end by default.66 End-to-end encryption 
for email remains a thorny challenge, however—Google and Yahoo 
                                                                                                                          
(Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005) (reporting the dismal results of a usability 
assessment of version 5 of Pretty Good Privacy [PGP], a tool for encrypting email). 
59 Whitten & Tygar, supra note 58, at 680. 
60 Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), at 
*4 (citations to draft dated Mar. 20, 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938033 [https://perma.cc/K6DM-LH57]). 
61 See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), at 
*32 (citations to draft dated Mar. 17, 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2935321 [https://perma.cc/E8WB-RQWH]). Rozenshtein claims that “regular 
Internet users don’t use PGP and Tor because both systems are difficult to use.” Id. (citing Whitten & 
Tygar, supra note 58; further citations omitted). He lays this problem at the feet of “open-source 
developers [who] lack the resources and organization to make them sufficiently user-friendly for 
widespread use,” whereas large companies like Apple and WhatsApp “have the money and talent,” as 
well as “legal and social clout,” “to build end-to-end encryption into their services so seamlessly that 
users communicate securely without even realizing it.” Id.  
62 Calo, supra note 6, at 39; see also Rozenshtein, supra note 61, at *33 (“the vast majority of 
users never bother to change those (or any other) default settings”) (citation omitted). 
63 Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/JA96-UWJ7] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
64 Id. (“Apple has no way to decrypt iMessage and FaceTime data when it’s in transit between 
devices. So unlike other companies’ messaging services, Apple doesn’t scan your communications, and 
we wouldn’t be able to comply with a wiretap order even if we wanted to.”). 
65 OPEN WHISPER SYSTEMS, https://whispersystems.org/ [https://perma.cc/S3W5-6J5X] (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2016) (“We cannot read your messages, and no one else can either. Everything is always 
end-to-end encrypted and painstakingly engineered in order to keep your communication safe.”). 
66 Cade Metz, Forget Apple vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion 
People, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-
whatsapp-just-switched-encryption-billion-people/; Martin Shelton, Upgrading WhatsApp Security, 
MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@mshelton/upgrading-whatsapp-security-
386c8ce496d3#.ze0z63ifv [https://perma.cc/9BKP-72AM]. 
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encrypt email messages in transit between user and server,67 but have yet to 
roll out end-to-end encryption despite years of effort.68 
The trend of improved encryption offerings extends to the encryption 
of data at rest as well. Apple encrypts iPhones and iPads by default; in fact, 
it does not allow users to disable device decryption.69 Mobile phones 
running Google’s Android mobile operating system can also be encrypted, 
although Android device encryption rates have lagged far behind iPhone’s 
for several reasons.70 Those challenges have hampered Google’s efforts to 
turn on default device encryption.71  
Beyond smartphones, there are also options for encrypting data stored 
on computers and in the cloud. Disk encryption is available for Apple, 
Microsoft, and Linux operating systems,72 though Apple and Microsoft do 
not turn this feature on by default.73 Finally, while they face their own set 
                                                                                                                          
67 Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
saferemail/faq/ [https://perma.cc/8PV6-9BSE] (last visited Feb. 7, 2016); Steven Musil, Yahoo Enables 
Default HTTPS Encryption for Yahoo Mail, CNET (Jan. 7, 2014, 7:48 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/yahoo-enables-default-https-encryption-for-yahoo-mail/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2N5-BQ52]. Relatedly, as of early 2017, around half of all Internet traffic is now 
encrypted, which provides security and privacy benefits to Internet users without demanding any 
affirmative measures on their part. Klint Finley, Half the Web Is Now Encrypted. That Makes Everyone 
Safer, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2017, 8:54 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/half-web-now-encrypted-
makes-everyone-safer/ [https://perma.cc/5T47-6Q7H]. 
68 Andy Greenberg, After 3 Years, Why Gmail’s End-to-End Encryption Is Still Vapor, WIRED 
(Feb. 28, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/3-years-gmails-end-end-encryption-still-
vapor/ [https://perma.cc/D3YT-79TE]; Wendy Lee, Yahoo, Google Still Working on End-to-End 
Encryption for Email, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 21, 2017, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Yahoo-Google-still-working-on-end-to-end-10872573.php 
[https://perma.cc/TW4B-AEV4].  
69 APPLE, IOS SECURITY: IOS 9.3 OR LATER 4 (2016), 
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZD7-A2AW]. 
70 Andrew Cunningham, Why Are so Few Android Phones Encrypted, and Should You Encrypt 
Yours?, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:54 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2016/03/why-are-
so-few-android-phones-encrypted-and-should-you-encrypt-yours/ [https://perma.cc/LU9D-CDQR]. 
71 Kaveh Waddell, Encryption Is a Luxury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/the-digital-security-divide/475590/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5N8-DQU5]. The gap between iPhone and Android perpetuates a “digital divide” 
along race and class lines: users of expensive iPhones tend to be well-educated and high earners, 
whereas less-costly Android phones, which have a majority market share, are primarily used by low-
income people and African-Americans—the very segments of the population most heavily surveilled 
by the government. Id.  
72 See Micah Lee, Encrypting Your Laptop Like You Mean It, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 27, 2015, 
10:36 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/04/27/encrypting-laptop-like-mean/ [https://perma.cc/LWP2-
FCF9] (providing a step-by-step how-to guide for various operating systems). 
73 How to Enable Full-Disk Encryption on Windows 10, HOW-TO GEEK, 
http://www.howtogeek.com/234826/how-to-enable-full-disk-encryption-on-windows-10/ 
[https://perma.cc/5K65-58AC] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017); Turn on Device Encryption, MICROSOFT, 
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/instantanswers/e7d75dd2-29c2-16ac-f03d-20cfdf54202f/turn-on-
device-encryption [https://perma.cc/M6U9-NJF3] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017); Use FileVault to Encrypt 
the Startup Disk on Your Mac, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837 
[https://perma.cc/P45E-A9JA] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  
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of challenges when it comes to encryption,74 cloud storage providers such 
as Dropbox and Box encrypt users’ files at rest in the cloud.75 
Encryption tools are still far from perfect when it comes to usability76 
and “defaulting to encryption.” And tradeoffs that favor either greater 
security or greater usability are an unavoidable part of life.77 Nevertheless, 
the welcome trend in crypto implementation by major U.S. companies with 
massive user bases means that hundreds of millions of people in the U.S. 
and worldwide finally have some fairly usable ways to protect their 
communications and stored data.  
B. “Going Dark” and Novel Forms of Electronic Evidence-Gathering 
The rise in communications and device encryption is a boon for user 
security. Law enforcement, however, has responded with dismay. 
Encryption makes information-gathering more difficult for law 
enforcement, and the more prevalent it becomes, the more that challenge 
grows. It is not clear that the problem is as serious as the authorities claim, 
particularly given the many sources of information still available to them. 
Nevertheless, law enforcement has been exploring other options, both legal 
and technological, for maintaining their surveillance capabilities as 
encryption grows ever more ubiquitous. 
1. “Going Dark”? Or . . . 
Encryption does not just keep hackers and criminals from accessing 
someone’s data; it can stymie law enforcement, too. Even if investigators 
obtain proper legal process to intercept communications in transit or to 
access data at rest, encryption poses a technological barrier to carrying out 
                                                                                                                          
74 See Thomas Ristenpart, There’s No One Perfect Method for Encryption in the Cloud, DARK 
READING (Jan. 26, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/cloud/theres-no-one-perfect-
method-for-encryption-in-the-cloud/a/d-id/1327972 [https://perma.cc/U5ZA-XB99] (explaining the 
challenges cloud technology faces with encryption). 
75 Box KeySafe: Encryption Key Management, BOX, https://www.box.com/security/keysafe 
[https://perma.cc/PSE5-T8NK] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017); Security, DROPBOX, 
https://www.dropbox.com/security [https://perma.cc/5P69-P265] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
76 See, e.g., Jonathan Geater, Why Johnny STILL Can’t Encrypt (Feb. 17, 2017) (presentation 
given at RSA Conference in San Francisco, Cal.) (abstract and recording of presentation available at 
https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17/agenda/sessions/6352-why-johnny-still-cant-encrypt 
[https://perma.cc/TT22-ZZ8N]) (arguing that the application program interfaces (APIs) for encryption 
tools are what need to be fixed, not users).  
77 Renowned computer security expert Bruce Schneier has criticized the “‘either/or’ thinking” of 
“security and usability as a trade-off[,]” wherein “a more secure system is less functional and more 
annoying, and a more capable, flexible, and powerful system is less secure.” This mindset, he says, 
perversely leads to “systems that are neither usable nor secure.” Bruce Schneier, Security Design: Stop 
Trying to Fix the User, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Oct. 3, 2016, 6:12 AM), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/10/security_design.html [https://perma.cc/E38K-KN4J].  
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the order.78 Law enforcement calls this issue “going dark”: criminals and 
terrorists will use encryption to cloak their activities from police eyes.79  
Law enforcement officials have been sounding warnings about 
encryption for over twenty years.80 When the issue first arose in the 1990s, 
the “going dark” battle in the Crypto Wars culminated in a compromise.81 
Since 1994, the federal Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act (CALEA) has required telecommunications carriers to make their 
systems wiretappable for law enforcement so that Americans’ phone calls 
do not “go dark.”82 However, carriers may provide encryption and need not 
maintain decryption capabilities.83 “Information services” (understood 
originally to mean Internet-related businesses and companies that set up 
operations online) are not included in the access mandate, meaning “[t]he 
Internet was completely exempted” from CALEA’s coverage.84  
These exceptions were less consequential in practical effect when 
CALEA was first enacted than they are today. As noted, encryption 
software was persistently user-unfriendly for a long time, so it 
understandably did not come into widespread use in the early years 
following CALEA’s passage. Between the guaranteed wiretappability of 
phone calls and the limited public adoption of encryption software, law 
enforcement’s “going dark” nightmare future failed to materialize.  
In recent years, however, CALEA’s “information services” exemption 
has taken on greater significance. “Information services” include email 
providers, messaging apps, social media services, and computer and 
smartphone manufacturers.85 Providers of those services have taken 
advantage of their legal freedom to offer encrypted consumer-oriented 
products and services. Now, with advances in user-friendliness and either 
ready availability or default implementation in many popular devices and 
                                                                                                                          
78 Going Dark, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/operational-
technology/going-dark [https://perma.cc/T95C-AYRL] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
79 Id.  
80 Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/JW9Y-X4SS] (“Law-enforcement and intelligence agencies contend that if strong 
[cryptographic] codes are widely available, their efforts to protect the public would be paralyzed. . . . If 
cryptography is not controlled, wiretapping could be rendered obsolete.”). 
81 Eric Geller, The Rise of the New Crypto War, DAILY DOT (July 10, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/encryption-crypto-war-james-comey-fbi-privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/D44E-JMUE]. 
82 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012). 
83 Id. § 1002(b)(3); see also Albert Gidari, CALEA Limits the All Writs Act and Protects the 
Security of Apple’s Phones, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Feb. 19, 2016, 6:26 PM), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/02/calea-limits-all-writs-act-and-protects-security-apples-
phones [https://perma.cc/3HJ7-RUKL]. 
84 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2); Geller, supra note 81. 
85 See Geller, supra note 81 (defining “information services” and showcasing how many modern 
features of internet communication are exempt). 
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services, encryption protects millions of people’s communications, 
devices, and stored records.86 The upshot is that law enforcement can no 
longer expect reliable, easy access to the plaintext contents of electronic 
communications and stored data of people they investigate or prosecute.87  
As encryption has finally become widespread, law enforcement 
officials have revived their anti-encryption arguments from the 1990s. The 
FBI renewed its warnings to the public in 2008 (when the phrase “going 
dark” appears to have been coined),88 and continued beating the drum in 
testimony to legislators over the next few years, even drafting legislation 
that would have closed the CALEA “information services” exemption.89  
Proponents of the “going dark” viewpoint found new cause for alarm 
in late 2014. Apple and Google announced that they were reworking the 
encryption in their respective mobile operating systems, such that they 
would no longer have the capability they had previously maintained to 
extract data from passcode-locked devices for police—even with a 
warrant.90 The law enforcement community swiftly condemned these 
changes.91 The FBI’s director said the two companies were “allow[ing] 
people to place themselves beyond the law.”92 Manhattan’s district 
                                                                                                                          
86 See supra Section II.A. 
87 See Going Dark, supra note 78 (discussing how the growing encryption of web traffic makes it 
harder for police to eavesdrop on a target’s online activities); see also Finley, supra note 67 (discussing 
how the rise of HTTPS has hampered law enforcement’s ability to eavesdrop on Internet traffic). 
88 Eric Geller, A Complete Guide to the New “Crypto Wars”, DAILY DOT (Apr. 26, 2016, 9:50 
AM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/encryption-crypto-wars-backdoors-timeline-security-privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/FJP2-NQT6]. 
89 Id.; see also Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law 
Enforcement Get What It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J. 
L. & TECH. 599, 621 (2016) (relating former FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni’s concerns about 
the future of law enforcement); Declan McCullagh, FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now, 
CNET (May 4, 2012, 9:24 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-
now/ [https://perma.cc/XV52-8NBV]. 
90 APPLE INC., LEGAL PROCESS GUIDELINES: U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (2015), 
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y22F-
VQU8] (“[U]pon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can 
extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices . . . running iOS 4 through 
iOS 7, [such as] SMS, iMessage, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. 
Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party app data.”); Craig Timberg, Apple 
Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search Warrants, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-
11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html [https://perma.cc/N8YJ-343U]; Craig Timberg, Newest Androids 
Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-
in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/ [https://perma.cc/LKR8-27MW]. 
91 See Timberg, supra note 90 (referencing comments by the former head of the FBI’s criminal 
investigative division on how default encryption is “problematic”). 
92 Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police out of Phones, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/
09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa 0153527_story.html [https://perma.cc/3MH8-NSWA]. 
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attorney published a heated op-ed in the Washington Post, claiming that 
the changes gave free rein to criminals and calling for congressional action 
if Apple and Google did not reverse them.93 To date, however, encryption 
continues to make gains, with no sign of retreat.94 
2. . . . A “Golden Age of Surveillance”? 
Although it recognizes encryption’s importance to people’s privacy 
and security, law enforcement nonetheless perceives encryption as a 
serious threat to its ability to do its job.95 What is not clear is whether the 
going dark “problem” is as big a threat as law enforcement claims. To 
critics of “going dark,” law enforcement is in a “golden age” of electronic 
surveillance that makes a wealth of data available to investigators 
notwithstanding encryption. 
One point critics note is law enforcement’s reliance on anecdotes and 
incomplete data. Officials cite individual instances of deplorable crimes for 
which investigators could not unlock smartphones that might contain 
evidence,96 without contextualizing the rarity of the “worst of the worst” 
crimes compared to run-of-the-mill offenses.97 Likewise, reporting in 
isolation the number of smartphones prosecutors have in custody but 
                                                                                                                          
93 Cyrus R. Vance Jr., Apple and Google Threaten Public Safety with Default Smartphone 
Encryption, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/apple-and-
google-threaten-public-safety-with-default-smartphone-encryption/2014/09/25/43af9bf0-44ab-11e4-
b437-1a7368204804_story.html [https://perma.cc/3N7P-N8VG]. 
94 See, e.g., Finley, supra note 67 (noting that at least half of all web traffic is encrypted); Metz, 
supra note 66 (discussing the ongoing implementation of end-to-end encryption into WhatsApp). 
95 Deciphering the Debate Over Encryption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Amy Hess, 
Exec. Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/deciphering-
the-debate-over-encryption [https://perma.cc/4FAU-5YGQ].  
96 See, e.g., MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY 9 (2015) [hereinafter DA 
2015 REPORT], 
http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/11.18.15%20Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%
20and%20Public%20Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XNA-2W5Z] (stating that prosecutors were unable 
to access smartphones in cases involving “homicide, attempted murder, sexual abuse of a child, sex 
trafficking, assault, and robbery”); Peter Holley, A Locked iPhone May Be the Only Thing Standing 
Between Police and This Woman’s Killer, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/26/a-locked-iphone-may-be-the-only-
thing-standing-between-police-and-this-womans-killer/ [https://perma.cc/JT9Z-XPD6] (prosecutors 
sought to access the locked iPhone of a murdered pregnant woman). 
97 See Riana Pfefferkorn, James Comey’s Default-Encryption Bogeyman, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 15, 
2016, 12:15 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28832/comeys-default-encryption-bogeyman/ 
[https://perma.cc/D682-AN8Z] (discussing how law enforcement’s public statements regarding “going 
dark” focus on how encryption helps criminals engaged in murders and sex crimes, when in reality the 
typical cases in which law enforcement is likely to encounter encryption are probably low-level drug 
offenses). 
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cannot unlock98 leaves out a crucial question: do prosecutors obtain 
convictions in those cases anyway?99 It appears they often do.100 If law 
enforcement can still successfully prosecute cases despite encryption, then 
the “going dark” issue is not (yet) as consequential as claimed.101 
The fact that an individual’s devices or communications are encrypted 
does not leave police empty-handed. Even with the growing ubiquity of 
encryption, numerous sources of metadata, and even content information, 
are still available to investigators through the usual channels of legal 
process.102 Professor Peter Swire coined the phrase “golden age of 
surveillance” to describe the sea of data law enforcement can now access, 
such as where people have been, who they know, and “databases that 
create digital dossiers about individuals’ lives.”103 These “massive gains,” 
he argues, have “more than offset” the losses attributable to encryption.104  
There is some evidence to support his contention. Encryption appears 
not to have significantly hindered wiretaps yet.105 Also, law enforcement 
                                                                                                                          
98 Compare DA 2015 REPORT, supra note, at 96 (reporting that in a one-year period from 
September 2014 through September 2015, the DA’s office was unable to execute approximately 111 
search warrants for smartphones running iOS 8, which Apple cannot decrypt for law enforcement), 
with The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Cyrus R. Vance Jr., Dist. Attorney for New 
York County), http://manhattanda.org/written-testimony-manhattan-da-cyrus-r-vance-jr-encryption-
tightrope-balancing-americans-security-an [https://perma.cc/D3EY-98WR] (reporting that the 111 
devices number had risen to 175, out of approximately 670 Apple devices in office’s custody), and 
MANHATTAN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY: AN UPDATE TO THE NOVEMBER 2015 REPORT 9 
(2016), http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Smartphone%20Encryption%
20and%20Public%20Safety:%20An%20Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QTG-8TF7] (reporting that the 
office was “locked out” of around 42% of smartphones taken into office’s custody in a three-month 
period in 2016). 
99 See Pfefferkorn, supra note 97 (stating that the DA 2015 REPORT does not mention “whether 
prosecutors successfully pursued those cases using other evidence; the total number of search warrants 
issued for smartphones during the period cited; how many of those devices turned out to be encrypted; 
and of those, how many warrants were successfully executed nevertheless.”).  
100 Patrick Howell O’Neill, Exclusive FOIA Documents Reveal 7 Cases in New York DA’s 
iPhone-Unlocking Push, DAILY DOT (Apr. 14, 2016, 8:57 AM), 
http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/iphone-encryption-manhattan-da-vance-foia/ [https://perma.cc/T2WC-
SUKS]. 
101 Encryption’s impact on law enforcement will shift over time, but it is too early to tell how. 
Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 41. 
102 See Peter Swire, The Golden Age of Surveillance, SLATE (July 15, 2015, 4:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/07/encryption_back_doors_aren_t_necessa
ry_we_re_already_in_a_golden_age_of.html [https://perma.cc/MEP2-LF6G] (discussing how the use 
of metadata and location information is available to law enforcement agencies, and that encryption 
need not be weakened to give those agencies tools to fight crime). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping 
on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 14–15 & 14–15 nn.59–60 (2014) (analyzing 
federal wiretap reporting data showing very few wiretaps where investigators encountered encryption 
and concluding that law enforcement will rarely have to resort to unusual methods in order to carry out 
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can still access the plaintext contents of most text messages sent, despite 
the growing popularity of encrypted messaging apps.106 The prevalence of 
Android phones may account for this. Over half of U.S. smartphones are 
Android phones,107 whose default messaging option is not encrypted end-
to-end.108 Most people do not change defaults,109 so a significant 
percentage of Android users’ (and, given Android’s market share, the 
general public’s) text messages will still be accessible by law enforcement. 
The same goes for device encryption, since most Android devices are not 
encrypted by default.110 In short, Android’s market dominance and defaults 
likely mitigate encryption’s impact on law enforcement.111  
Even where the plaintext contents of messages cannot be intercepted—
and we know of a few cases where WhatsApp112 and iMessage113 
encryption supposedly stymied wiretap orders—metadata about the 
messages typically remains available from the provider (with Signal a 
notable exception).114 Metadata is highly useful in law enforcement 
                                                                                                                          
Title III wiretaps); see also Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Feds and Cops Encountered Encryption in 
Only 13 Wiretaps in 2015, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (June 30, 2016 1:30 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wiretap-report-feds-and-cops-encountered-encryption-in-
only-13-wiretaps-in-2015 [https://perma.cc/9Z3S-KMJN] (“Once again, for the second straight year, 
the number of times [that] state or federal wiretaps [] encountered encryption, decreased . . . .”). But see 
Bellovin et al., supra, at 105 (“Even if law enforcement does not currently have a serious problem in 
conducting authorized wiretaps, with time it will.”). 
106 Swire, supra note 102. 
107 Waddell, supra note 71. 
108 Id.  
109 Calo, supra note 6, at 39. 
110 Cunningham, supra note 70. 
111 What is more, the groups most likely to be targeted for surveillance are the very people who 
tend to use Android phones, Waddell, supra note 71—meaning the choice of whom to surveil helps 
predict the (un)likelihood of encountering encryption when doing so. 
112 See Matt Apuzzo, WhatsApp Encryption Said to Stymie Wiretap Order, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/us/politics/whatsapp-encryption-said-to-stymie-wiretap-
order.html?_r=0 (“No decision has been made, but a court fight with WhatsApp, the world’s largest 
mobile messaging service, would open a new front in the Obama administration’s dispute with Silicon 
Valley over encryption, security and privacy.”). 
113 See Matt Apuzzo, David E. Sanger, & Michael S. Schmidt, Apple and Other Tech Companies 
Tangle with U.S. Over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to-data.html 
(reporting “several” cases in which Apple “rebuffed” iMessage wiretap requests). The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) reportedly shelved the idea of taking Apple to court over its inability to comply. Id. 
114 Swire, supra note 102. Apple and WhatsApp retain messaging metadata, which they produce 
to law enforcement pursuant to valid legal process; Apple has even disclosed the phone numbers to 
which an iMessage user started composing an ultimately unsent message. Sam Biddle, Apple Logs 
Your iMessage Contacts—And May Share Them with Police, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00 
AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/28/apple-logs-your-imessage-contacts-and-may-share-them-
with-police/. Signal, by contrast, retains minimal metadata; in response to a subpoena, it can disclose 
only the time an account was created and the account’s date of last connection to Signal’s servers. 
Cyrus Farivar, FBI Demands Signal User Data, But There’s Not Much to Hand Over, ARS TECHNICA 
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investigations because it “leaves traces of every electronic communication 
a suspect has, showing whom they speak to, how often, how long, and 
from where,”115 allowing investigators to reconstruct a detailed picture of 
an individual’s activities and contacts (and their activities and contacts).116 
Access to metadata is not a 100% replacement for access to content, but it 
remains a powerful tool for law enforcement investigations. 
For content information, police can turn to remote storage sources in 
lieu of intercepts or seizures of data from encrypted devices.117 Professor 
Swire argued several years ago that encryption was prompting a shift in 
law enforcement strategy from real-time intercepts of data, which were 
becoming more likely to be encrypted in transit, to seeking stored data, 
especially in the cloud.118 Cloud storage services’ encryption practices do 
not necessarily preclude them from compliance with government requests 
for content information.119 WhatsApp lets users back up their messages, 
but stores them in a form that is readable by WhatsApp (and thus by law 
enforcement).120 The same is true of Signal backups.121 Apple encrypts user 
data stored in iCloud,122 but it can, and does, disclose iCloud-stored user 
                                                                                                                          
(Oct. 4, 2016, 1:29 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/10/fbi-demands-signal-user-data-
but-theres-not-much-to-hand-over/ [http://perma.cc/RS6J-4BW9]. 
115 Swire, supra note 102. 
116 See Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with Metadata?, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whats-the-matter-with-metadata [https://perma.cc/D9CB-
J6SW] (quoting security expert and Don’t Panic co-author Susan Landau as saying that metadata is 
“much more intrusive than content”; armed with communications metadata, investigators “know 
exactly what is happening—[they] don’t need the content”). 
117 See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 28?29 (discussing options available within the 
“locate a plaintext copy” category of encryption workarounds and setting forth the necessary 
requirements for the search to succeed). 
118 Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why Encryption Drives the 
Government to Seek Access to the Cloud, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 200, 202?03 (2012), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ips025 [https://perma.cc/8RPS-S4J4] (noting that despite previous low 
adoption rates, “widespread encryption adoption is well under way for email and voice 
communications” and given obstacles encryption poses to other means of access, “agencies will thus 
increasingly depend on access to stored records, notably those stored in the cloud”). 
119 See, e.g., DROPBOX, 2016 TRANSPARENCY REPORT: JANUARY TO JUNE 2016 (2016), 
https://www.dropbox.com/transparency/?_tk=mb&_camp=news&_ad=transparency-h1-
2016&_net=trans-prin [https://perma.cc/B376-9XRF] (reporting that in the six-month period from 
January to June 2016, Dropbox provided content information for 467 accounts pursuant to 328 search 
warrants). 
120 See Shelton, supra note 66 (noting that WhatsApp allows users to back up their media and 
messages to the cloud, but the data is not protected by WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption while in 
Google Drive or while in iCloud). 
121 See Masha Kolenkina, How Do I Import or Export Messages?, SIGNAL SUPPORT, 
https://support.whispersystems.org/hc/en-us/articles/212535828-How-do-I-import-or-export-messages- 
[https://perma.cc/8Z3U-9E7P] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) (noting that “exported Signal messages will 
not be encrypted and are stored as plaintext”). 
122 See iCloud Security and Privacy Overview, APPLE SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT202303 [https://perma.cc/6EHT-7NEG] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) (stating that “iCloud secures 
your information by encrypting it when it’s sent over the Internet”). 
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information (which can include numerous categories of data) to law 
enforcement.123 Android users can back up their data to Google Drive (if 
their phone model supports it), where the backups are accessible to law 
enforcement with a warrant.124 In short, the rise of cloud storage has 
mitigated the effects on law enforcement investigations of the concurrent 
rise of device and messaging encryption. 
Other sources of information with considerable potential for law 
enforcement use are the Internet of Things (IoT) and existing 
vulnerabilities in consumer software and hardware.125 The new 
technologies that make our lives more convenient can also make us easier 
to surveil—for example, by turning the on-board driver assistance system 
in our cars into a roving wiretap,126 or monitoring our homes through an 
IoT-connected device.127 The burgeoning IoT opens up a whole new world 
                                                                                                                          
123 See Brian Barrett, How Apple Could Make Your iPhone and Mac Even More Secure, WIRED 
(June 10, 2016, 6:59 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/apple-security-improvements/ 
[https://perma.cc/BF7Y-GASX] (noting that Apple often “hand[s] over data to law enforcement when 
asked” and can do so because “while iCloud backups are encrypted, Apple maintains a copy of the 
keys”); Andy Greenberg, Two Tips to Keep Your Phone’s Encrypted Messages Encrypted, WIRED 
(Apr. 26, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/tips-for-encrypted-messages/ 
[https://perma.cc/GL3X-BBQE] (noting that messages backed up to Apple’s iCloud servers are “open 
to all the usual risks of exposure to hackers, to Apple . . . or to any government that can force those 
companies to turn over the data”); APPLE, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REQUESTS: 
JANUARY 1–JUNE 30, 2016 (2016), https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/transparency/requests-2016-
H1-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YCX-KJW9] (stating that the company will “provide customers’ iCloud 
content, which may include stored photos, email, iOS device backups, documents, contacts, calendars, 
and bookmarks” in response to a search warrant). 
124 See Jason Cipriani, What You Need to Know about Encryption on Your Phone, CNET (Mar. 
10, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/iphone-android-encryption-fbi/ 
[https://perma.cc/65HL-J29J] (“As with Apple’s iCloud Backup practices, data within a backup stored 
on Google’s serves is accessible by the company when presented with a warrant by law enforcement”). 
125 The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is a “network of internet-connected objects able to collect and 
exchange data using embedded sensors.” It specifically “refers to the connection of devices (other than 
typical fare such as computers and smartphones) to the Internet, including “[c]ars, kitchen appliances, 
and even heart monitors.” See Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, BUS. INSIDER 
(Dec. 19, 2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-internet-of-things-definition-
2016-8 [https://perma.cc/AMT8-UTCL] (explaining the Internet of Things and providing a glossary of 
terms and basic definitions). 
126 This idea dates back at least fifteen years, to when the FBI sought to use a vehicle’s on-board 
driver-assistance system “as a roving ‘bug.’” Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132, 1133?34 (9th 
Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that a provision of the Wiretap Act 
required the service provider to comply with court orders compelling the provider’s assistance, because 
“FBI surveillance completely disabled the monitored car’s [s]ystem,” in violation of the Wiretap Act’s 
requirement that any technical assistance must be “accomplish[ed] . . . with a minimum of interference” 
to the service provided. Id. at 1145?47; 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (describing the requirements for an 
“order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication” and 
indicating that such an order must be accomplished “unobtrusively and with a minimum of 
interference”).  
127 See URS GASSER ET AL., THE BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIV., 
DON’T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 13?15 (2016), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-
 
 1414 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1393 
of audio, video, and metadata that can be repurposed from consumer to law 
enforcement use, “as long as [such uses] are appropriately authorized, 
resourced, and overseen.”128  
Surveillance through the IoT will repurpose intentional features of IoT 
devices. Law enforcement also exploits bugs—unintentional flaws—in 
commercial software products. The government has been exploiting 
software vulnerabilities to catch suspected criminals for most of this 
century.129 Recently, the government evidently exploited a browser 
vulnerability to hack over a thousand computers on the basis of a single 
warrant.130 “[G]overnment hacking can raise complex legal questions 
under the Fourth Amendment and other laws,”131 and unsurprisingly, the 
legality of that single warrant has been challenged in numerous 
prosecutions that stemmed from the operation.132 But while exploiting 
                                                                                                                          
panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L7E-28XU] 
[hereinafter DON’T PANIC] (detailing how “[t]he audio and video sensors on IoT devices will open up 
numerous avenues for government actors to demand access to real-time and recorded 
communications”).  
128 Pell, supra note 89, at 635. The IoT is a much likelier avenue than side-channel attacks for 
authorities to keep gathering information in the face of an increasingly encrypted world. See DON’T 
PANIC, supra note 127, at 13?15 (describing how IoT devices will provide authorities new 
opportunities to gather information). The IoT offers multiple advantages over side-channel attacks in 
terms of cost (borne by IoT consumers and vendors, not law enforcement) and simplicity (IoT devices’ 
audio, video, and metadata records are readily intelligible to police). We can thus expect that law 
enforcement will be using IoT devices for surveillance far more often than they will ever use side-
channel attacks, and sooner. See Pell, supra note 89, at 641?43 (discussing the advantages IoT devices 
provide law enforcement over traditional methods of surveillance, such as wiretapping of phones). In 
fact, it’s doing so already. See Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors 
in Murder Investigation, NPR (Dec. 28, 2016, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/28/507230487/as-we-leave-more-digital-tracks-
amazon-echo-factors-in-murder-investigation [https://perma.cc/R3U9-43VT] (describing how Arkansas 
police served a search warrant to Amazon for data on its servers that was recorded by the Echo 
personal assistant device in the house where they suspected a murder had been committed). 
129 See Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking Software Decade Before iPhone Fight, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-
years-ago-files-show.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P77U-CR2Z] (describing how the FBI was using 
spyware as part of a criminal wiretap as early as 2003); Kevin Poulsen, Documents: FBI Spyware Has 
Been Snaring Extortionists, Hackers for Years, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2009, 9:33 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/ [https://perma.cc/GTL2-7U5R] (describing how the 
FBI has been using spyware to infiltrate computers for at least seven years as part of its criminal 
investigations). Hacking by the government is a complex topic that was well addressed—from 
technical and policy standpoints, not a legal one—in Lawful Hacking. See generally Bellovin et al., 
supra note 105 (providing a comprehensive discussion of hacking by the government). 
130 See Joseph Cox, The FBI’s ‘Unprecedented’ Hacking Campaign Targeted over a Thousand 
Computers, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-
fbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaign-targeted-over-a-thousand-computers [https://perma.cc/N7Z5-
46SY] (detailing the FBI’s hack over a thousand computers to fight “what it has called one of the 
largest child pornography sites on the dark web”). 
131 Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 26. 
132 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Government ‘Hacking’ and the Playpen Search Warrant, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/27/
government-hacking-and-the-playpen-search-warrant/ [https://perma.cc/84NR-A6LG] (presenting legal 
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existing security vulnerabilities in computer systems may be a legally 
chancy strategy,133 these flaws will always exist.134 That means 
investigators will have plenty of low-hanging fruit to pluck when they seek 
to circumvent encryption and gain access to a target’s computer, without 
any need to resort to a side-channel attack.135  
In the view of “going dark” critics, encryption is far from leaving law 
enforcement in the dark. Whether that will continue to be true remains to 
be seen, and will depend in part on the success of various “encryption 
workarounds,” both legal and technological.136 
3. Law Enforcement’s Legal and Technological Responses to “Going 
Dark” 
Notwithstanding the numerous sources of information available to 
them and the unclear extent of the “going dark” problem, law enforcement 
officials have nevertheless advocated for both legal and technological 
measures to counteract what they call “warrant-proof” encryption’s137 
effects on their information-gathering capabilities. As this subsection will 
explain, law enforcement has asked legislatures to change the law and 
courts to authorize novel strategies for gathering digital evidence. 
                                                                                                                          
issues that arise from the FBI’s takeover of a child pornography site in 2014 and subsequent 
transmission of malware to the browsers of visitors to the site, such as those involving Fourth 
Amendment rights, the limitations of single warrants, and violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure). 
133 Law enforcement has long been aware of the suppression risks associated with its hacking 
activities. One early strategy “became so popular with federal law enforcement that Justice Department 
lawyers in Washington warned that overuse of the novel technique could result in its electronic 
evidence being thrown out of court in some cases.” Poulsen, supra note 129. A March 7, 2002 memo 
from the Department of Justice warned that use of the spyware program raised “difficult legal 
questions” and suppression risks “without any countervailing benefit.” See id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
134 Bellovin et al., supra note 105 at 27–28 (explaining that vulnerabilities will never go away 
despite programmers’ best efforts to engineer all the bugs out of their code). 
135 KUHN, supra note 32, at 133 (observing in 2003 that EM side-channel attacks were not yet a 
“practically relevant information security threat,” and that “[t]he vast majority of practical 
vulnerabilities can be exploited using comparatively simple and purely software-based techniques”; 
adding caustically, “[t]his is likely to remain the case, as long as information security is only a 
secondary consideration in the design and selection of products, equally neglected by both product 
designers and end users.”).  
136 See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 4, 40. Kerr and Schneier set forth six 
categories of encryption workarounds: “find the key,” “guess the key,” “compel the key,” “exploit a 
flaw,” “access plaintext when in use,” and “locate a plaintext copy.” Id. at 9–29. Electromagnetic key-
recovery attacks are not discussed in the article, but come closest to a combination of “find the key” 
and “exploit a flaw.” 
137 E.g., Aarti Shahani, Does Encryption Make Phones 'Warrantproof'? Fact-Checking the FBI, 
NPR (Mar. 7, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/07/469545328/does-encryption-make-
phones-warrant-proof-fact-checking-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/PV5B-NW4Y] (“Apple’s lawyer tells 
NPR that Comey’s rhetoric about warrant-proof space is just that – rhetoric – because he’s got a 
warrant.”). 
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Simultaneously, law enforcement agents rely on digital forensics tools and 
“hacks” to circumvent the encryption they encounter during investigations.  
The past two years have seen legislative proposals at both the state and 
federal level concerning law enforcement’s access to encrypted 
information. At state level, bills introduced (unsuccessfully) in three states, 
including one based largely on the Manhattan district attorney’s model 
bill,138 would have either forced or induced smartphone manufacturers to 
ensure that law enforcement could access encrypted smartphones.139  
In the Senate, two senators drafted a bill last year to require covered 
entities (such as smartphone makers) to comply with court orders for 
information by either providing it in “intelligible” form or supplying any 
technical assistance “necessary” to render encrypted data intelligible.140 
The bill would have effectively closed the “information services” 
exemption in CALEA, though it did not acknowledge this impact.141 After 
digital security experts roundly condemned the bill, its authors quietly let it 
die on the vine.142 Subsequently, despite earlier testimony that he would 
not seek “going dark” legislation,143 then-FBI Director Comey vowed to 
raise the issue anew this year to the new Congress and administration.144 
                                                                                                                          
138 The language of the New York bill and proposed statutory language by the Manhattan district 
attorney’s office are almost identical. Compare A.B. A8093, 2016 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), with DA 
2015 REPORT app. I. 
139 A.B. 1681, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (bill that would have penalized makers of smartphones 
and mobile operating systems which they cannot decrypt for law enforcement); H.B. 1040, 2016 Reg. 
Sess. (La. 2016) (bill that would have also penalized makers of smartphones and mobile operating 
systems which they cannot decrypt for law enforcement); A.B. A8093, 2016 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015) 
(bill to require smartphones to be decryptable for law enforcement).  
140 Riana Pfefferkorn, Here’s What the Burr-Feinstein Anti-Crypto Bill Gets Wrong, JUST 
SECURITY (Apr. 15, 2016, 9:25 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/30606/burr-feinstein-crypto-bill-
terrible/ [https://perma.cc/W7Z6-L5M5]. 
141 Id.  
142 Mark Hosenball, Joseph Menn, & Dustin Volz, Push for Encryption Law Falters Despite 
Apple Case Spotlight, REUTERS (May 27, 2016, 1:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
encryption-legislation-idUSKCN0YI0EM [https://perma.cc/DB2M-SSVR]; Leak of Senate Encryption 
Bill Prompts Swift Backlash, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-
encryption-legislation-idUSKCN0X52CG [https://perma.cc/QEC6-NED8].  
143 See David Kravets, Obama Administration Won’t Seek Encryption-Backdoor Legislation, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 9, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/obama-administration-
wont-seek-encryption-backdoor-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/TA6H-GHEQ] (“Comey said the 
administration for now will continue lobbying private industry to create backdoors to allow the 
authorities to open up locked devices to investigate criminal cases and terrorism.”). 
144 See Associated Press, FBI Director Wants to Resolve Encryption Issue Before ‘Something 
Terrible Happens’, NEWS.COM (July 28, 2016, 8:51 PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/
online/security/fbi-director-wants-to-resolve-encryption-issue-before-something-terrible-happens/
news-story/c5dfc8d368719151bfa273147cbca770 [https://perma.cc/5ZMY-2884] (reporting that the 
FBI “is collecting encryption-related data from its cases, with the expectation that the debate will 
resurface [in 2017],” and that “talks will probably have to wait until after a new president takes 
office”); Joe Mullin, FBI Chief Comey: “We Have Never Had Absolute Privacy”, ARS TECHNICA 
(Aug. 9, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/fbi-chiefs-complaints-about-
going-dark-arent-going-away-will-be-revived-next-year/ [https://perma.cc/C5VL-5YN9] (reporting that 
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In the courts, law enforcement has tried several legal strategies for 
gaining access to encrypted information. Federal and state law enforcement 
agents have sought to compel people to provide passcodes or fingerprints 
to unlock their encrypted smartphones, raising Fifth Amendment issues. 
The law in this area is still evolving,145 and the analysis is highly fact-
dependent. With regard to passphrases, courts have come out in different 
ways depending on the particulars of the case.146 When it comes to 
fingerprints, the government has had more uniform success.147 In the few 
known instances to date that involve the issue, courts have typically let 
compelled fingerprint-unlocking go forward.148  
                                                                                                                          
the FBI plans to take its revived encryption push to Congress as well in 2017); Mike Orcutt, The Next 
Big Encryption Fight, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603534/the-next-big-encryption-fight/ [https://perma.cc/HL96-
XBNE] (noting possible congressional or executive-branch avenues for action). 
145 See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 19 (“How the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine 
applies to compelled decryption is presently uncertain. The open question is what facts must be 
established as known by the government to make the testimony implicit in decryption a foregone 
conclusion.”); see generally id. at 15–21 (discussing the “practical and legal hurdles rather than 
technical ones” that arise in the “compel the key” category of encryption workaround). 
146 Compare Florida v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 132, 136–37, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (reviewing 
cases “that have addressed the Fifth Amendment implications for providing decryption keys and 
passcodes[, which] have largely applied the act-of-production doctrine and the ‘foregone conclusion 
exception’” and concluding that the act of providing the phone’s passcode was not testimonial and that 
the foregone conclusion exception applied), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 
1335, 1346–49 (11th Cir. 2012) (collecting the cases that had addressed the passcode issue at that time 
and concluding that the Fifth Amendment protected the defendant’s refusal to decrypt his encrypted 
devices “because the act of decryption and production would be testimonial, and because the 
Government cannot show that the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine applies”), and United States v. Apple 
Mac Pro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (questioning in dicta whether the correct 
focus of the foregone conclusion analysis is on “the Government’s knowledge of the content of the 
[encrypted] devices” or instead “on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is 
implicit in the act of production”). See generally Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third 
Parties: Why the Fourth and Fifth Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals When Third 
Parties Are Forced to Hand Over Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 14–27 (2015) [hereinafter 
Wilson, Compelling Passwords] (surveying and discussing Fifth Amendment passcode cases). 
147 See Cyrus Farivar, To Beat Crypto, Feds Have Tried to Force Fingerprint Unlocking in 2 
Cases, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 20, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/10/to-beat-
crypto-feds-have-tried-to-force-fingerprint-unlocking-in-2-cases/ [https://perma.cc/QV6B-TMSE] 
[hereinafter To Beat Crypto] (discussing the government’s Fifth Amendment arguments). 
148 E.g., State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 149–51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review granted, No. 
A15-2075 (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017) (holding such compulsion not a Fifth Amendment violation); In re 
Search Warrant Application for [Redacted], No. 17-M-85, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169384 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 18, 2017) (not a Fifth Amendment violation if police, with a warrant, apply fingers of home’s 
four residents onto iPhone’s TouchID sensor); In re Search of iPhone Seized from 3254 Altura Ave. in 
Glendale, Cal., No. 2:16-mj-00398, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://ia601603.us.archive.org/2/items/gov.uscourts.cacd.641321/gov.uscourts.cacd.641321.3.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FHY-S79V] (search warrant authorizing law enforcement agents to depress 
individual’s fingerprints onto seized iPhone’s TouchID sensor); To Beat Crypto, supra note 147 
(discussing two other fingerprint-unlocking search warrants); see also Wilson, Compelling Passwords, 
supra note 146, at 28 n.164 (citing cases that have allowed compelled finger-print unlocking to go 
forward). 
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The government has argued for aggressive interpretations of federal 
law in support of its alleged surveillance and investigative authority.149 The 
FBI relied on the Stored Communications Act (SCA)150 and the Pen 
Register Act’s technical-assistance provision151 to obtain court orders and a 
seizure warrant compelling encrypted email service provider Lavabit to 
hand over its private Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption keys.152 A 
federal appeals court declined for procedural reasons to decide whether 
those statutes in fact permit the seizure of encryption keys.153 
The DOJ has also obtained dozens of orders compelling Apple and 
Google to bypass the passcodes of locked, encrypted iPhones and Android 
phones for which law enforcement had a warrant, in order to extract data 
from the phones.154 It advocates for an expansive interpretation of the 
federal All Writs Act (AWA)155 that would allow courts to enlist private 
non-parties such as Apple into assisting in investigations.156 While the 
                                                                                                                          
149 See generally JENNIFER GRANICK & RIANA PFEFFERKORN, WHEN THE COPS COME A-
KNOCKING: HANDLING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DEMANDS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Granick-When-The-Cops-Come-A-Knocking-
Handling-Technical-Assistance-Demands-From-Law-Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGK2-
LVWF] (slide deck for talk delivered at 2016 Black Hat USA conference, reviewing various kinds of 
technical assistance law enforcement has sought or may seek from third-party companies). 
150 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). 
151 Id. § 3124(a) (2012) (“Upon the request of [a government agent], a provider of wire or 
electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furnish [the agent] 
forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of 
the pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference . . . .”). 
152 In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2014). The target of the investigation was 
later revealed to be former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Kim Zetter, A Government Error Just 
Revealed Snowden Was the Target in the Lavabit Case, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:30 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/government-error-just-revealed-snowden-target-lavabit-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZT9-VTVQ]. 
153 In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 287–89. The service provider, Lavabit, eventually produced the 
keys, then immediately shut down entirely. Kim Zetter, Long Before the Apple-FBI Battle, Lavabit 
Sounded a Warning, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/lavabit-apple-
fbi/ [https://perma.cc/6ULL-32DP]. Lavabit relaunched in early 2017. See Kim Zetter, Encrypted Email 
Service Once Used by Edward Snowden Relaunches, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 20, 2017, 12:57 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/20/encrypted-email-service-once-used-by-edward-snowden-to-
relaunch/ [https://perma.cc/2L85-VWZL] (“Rather than undermine the trust and privacy of his users, 
Levison ended the company’s email service entirely, preventing the feds from getting access to emails 
stored on his servers.”). 
154 For a map of all known cases, see All Writs Act Orders for Assistance from Tech Companies, 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/all-writs-act-orders-assistance-tech-companies 
[https://perma.cc/86WQ-2M7J] (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
155 The AWA permits federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
156 See Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn, The All Writs Act, Software Licenses, and Why 
Judges Should Ask More Questions, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 26, 2015, 4:07 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/27109/writs-act-software-licenses-judges-questions/ 
[https://perma.cc/JUL9-VN5G] (“Under the government’s interpretation of the All Writs Act, anyone 
who makes software could be dragooned into assisting the government in investigating users of the 
software.”). 
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AWA does allow courts to issue orders to non-parties, it is not clear how 
far it can be stretched.157 Only two courts have issued public opinions 
analyzing these orders’ propriety, and they came out opposite ways.158 
Again on the basis of the AWA, the government asked for an unheard-
of form of novel technical assistance when it wanted access to a passcode-
locked iPhone running iOS 9 which had been used by one of the 
perpetrators of the December 2015 terror attack in San Bernardino, 
California.159 The government sought, and originally received, an AWA 
order compelling Apple to write a custom version of iOS for installation on 
the phone.160 Rather than targeting the iPhone’s encryption, the custom 
software instead would roll back other security features that prevented law 
enforcement from running a program to “brute-force” guess the phone’s 
passcode.161 After a short but feverish legal battle popularly dubbed “Apple 
vs. FBI,” the government dropped the case when it gained access to the 
phone by purchasing an exploit from an undisclosed vendor.162 The court 
vacated its original order to Apple163 without addressing the merits of the 
                                                                                                                          
157 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–75 (1977) (observing that the AWA 
allowed a court to issue an order binding a non-party because there was no other way for the 
government to carry out its court-authorized surveillance, the non-party was not too “far removed from 
the underlying controversy,” and compliance with the order would not be unduly burdensome). 
158 Compare In re Order Requiring XXX, Inc., No. 14 MAG. 2258, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
154743, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2014) (concluding that under the AWA, “it is appropriate to order 
the manufacturer here to attempt to unlock the cellphone so that the warrant may be executed as 
originally contemplated”), with In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(concluding that the AWA does not permit the relief the government sought, and even if it did, the 
government’s application did not satisfy the factors a court may use in deciding whether to issue a 
requested writ).  
159 Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San 
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903ee-
d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?utm_term=.59773f1934ce [https://perma.cc/L7RJ-EYYR]. 
Apple can extract data only from iPhones running an older version of iOS. See supra note 90 and 
accompanying text. 
160 Nakashima, supra note 159.  
161 Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On, WIRED (Feb. 
18, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-is-complicated-heres-whats-
really-going-on/ [https://perma.cc/F4C7-FLX6]. 
162 E.g., Elias Groll, FBI Confirms It Won’t Reveal iPhone Exploit to Apple, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Apr. 27, 2016, 2:14 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/27/fbi-confirms-it-wont-reveal-iphone-
exploit-to-apple/ [https://perma.cc/F8KT-NNY7]; Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers 
One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-
to-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d36-
33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.81fcea955737 [https://perma.cc/7RPD-YVUW]; Elizabeth 
Weise, Apple v FBI Timeline: 43 Days That Rocked Tech, USA TODAY (Mar. 15, 2016, 6:26 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/15/apple-v-fbi-timeline/81827400/ 
[https://perma.cc/3GJR-NH3G] [hereinafter Apple v FBI Timeline].  
163 Apple v FBI Timeline, supra note 162.  
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FBI’s broad legal arguments, leaving the AWA’s scope still undefined.164 
“Apple vs. FBI” shows that law enforcement need not rely on pushing 
aggressive legal theories in order to get help in circumventing encryption. 
Law enforcement has a long history of exploiting hardware and software 
vulnerabilities to “hack” into suspects’ electronic devices.165 Federal, state, 
and local police also use digital forensics tools to crack passcodes and 
extract data from devices.166 Such tools are now commonplace in city 
police departments nationwide.167 Police can get data off locked devices, 
recover deleted text messages and photos, and access data in the cloud, all 
without assistance from service providers or smartphone makers.168  
Between government hacking and third-party digital forensics devices, 
police have a number of technological tools available to get access to 
electronic evidence. These technological means further call into question 
law enforcement’s claim that encryption’s rise is causing it to “go dark.” 
C. Side-Channel Attacks Aren’t a Feasible Law Enforcement 
Technique—Yet 
The availability of so many options for information-gathering makes it 
seem somewhat premature to discuss the constitutionality of warrantless 
side-channel attacks. The police probably are not using side-channel 
attacks at present and probably won’t for a while yet. Investigators won’t 
resort to difficult, high-tech surveillance strategies unless the amount of 
plaintext and metadata available through established surveillance 
                                                                                                                          
164 Alina Selyukh, Apple vs. the FBI: The Unanswered Questions and Unsettled Issues, NAT’L 
PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 29, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2016/03/29/472141323/apple-vs-the-fbi-the-unanswered-questions-and-unsettled-issues 
[https://perma.cc/Q3E8-6XY3]; see also Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 30 (predicting that 
“the degree of third-party assistance that can be legally compelled is likely to be a continuing theme of 
the law of encryption workarounds”). 
165 See Bellovin, supra note 105, at 31–32, 43 (addressing the government’s exploitation of 
vulnerabilities, the warrant issues that arise in this context, and the vulnerability and exploit markets); 
see supra Section II.B.2 and notes 137–38. 
166 Joseph B. Evans, Cell Phone Forensics: Powerful Tools Wielded by Federal Investigators, 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (June 2, 2016), http://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2016/06/02/cell-phone-
forensics-powerful-tools-wielded-by-federal-investigators/ [https://perma.cc/XBB4-2D8Y]. Indeed, the 
government had considered, but ultimately rejected, the use of such tools in the “Apple vs. FBI” case. 
See Jennifer Granick & Riana Pfefferkorn, A Quick Update: Apple, Privacy, and the All Writs Act of 
1789, JUST SEC. (Oct. 30, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27214/quick-update-apple-
privacy-writs-act-1789/ [https://perma.cc/A8DX-CNFP] (discussing the use of forensics tools in the 
“Apple vs. FBI” case). 
167 George Joseph, Cellphone Spy Tools Have Flooded Local Police Departments, CITYLAB (Feb. 
8, 2017), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2017/02/cellphone-spy-tools-have-flooded-local-police-
departments/512543/ [https://perma.cc/VH2E-8FAM] [hereinafter Joseph]; Curtis Waltman, How the 
Denver Police Crack and Search Cell Phones, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 11, 2017 9:00 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-the-denver-police-crack-and-search-cell-phones 
[https://perma.cc/59PG-AZ4Q] [hereinafter Waltman]. 
168 Joseph, supra note 167. 
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mechanisms, government hacking, and forensics tools really does 
plummet. 
Side-channel attacks are not only unnecessary at present, they are 
impractical. Agents need to buy the requisite equipment, learn to use it 
correctly, and position it (and usually themselves) close to the target’s 
device(s) for as long as needed to accomplish the attack. The equipment 
needed is usually conspicuous and/or very limited in range. What is more, 
even after collecting the side-channel information, agents have to take 
additional steps to convert the raw data they collected into information 
they can actually use: the target’s secret encryption key. This means having 
specialist personnel on hand (i.e., a trained computer scientist), and the 
process may fail multiple times before a key is extracted successfully.169 
These considerations make side-channel attacks much less attractive 
than traditional police methods, established electronic-surveillance 
methods, and digital forensics. Tailing a target in person takes up agents’ 
time, but it does not take a Ph.D. in computer science to learn how to do it. 
Fully-remote surveillance (such as carrying out a Title III wiretap) is more 
convenient than having to monitor a target from nearby. Getting the 
target’s emails from his service provider may cost money, but paying out a 
reimbursement to the carrier170 (which maintains all the servers, stores all 
the data, and does all the work) is more straightforward than equipment 
procurement, assembly, testing, and training. Digital forensics devices cost 
money, too, but the costs are relatively modest171—and, notably, many 
                                                                                                                          
169 For example, in one recently-demonstrated electromagnetic key-extraction attack on mobile 
devices, after measuring an iPhone’s electromagnetic emanations, actually extracting the secret 
encryption key required multiple steps of signal processing and cryptanalysis; the final step alone took 
two hours, and the researchers successfully recovered the secret key only twice out of thirty tries. See 
ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 13–14. 
170 See 18 U.S.C. § 2706 (2012) (requiring the government to pay a fee to service providers when 
it “obtain[s] the contents of communications, records, or other information” from them under certain 
sections of the Stored Communications Act, as “reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably 
necessary and which have been directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or 
otherwise providing such information”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012) (requiring compensation for 
wiretap assistance); 18 U.S.C. § 3124(c) (2012) (requiring compensation for assistance with pen 
registers and trap-and-trace devices). 
171 The exploit used to access the iPhone at issue in the “Apple vs. FBI” matter allegedly cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, but that is atypical. Mark Hosenball, FBI Paid Under $1 Million to 
Unlock San Bernardino iPhone: Sources, REUTERS (May 4, 2016, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-idUSKCN0XQ032 [https://perma.cc/JAV7-
B5XY]. Digital forensics company Cellebrite’s services cost as little as $1,500. Thomas Fox-Brewster, 
It Might Cost the FBI Just $1,500 to Get into Terrorist’s iPhone, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/03/23/cellebrite-apple-iphone-fbi-syed-farook-
alexander-boettcher/#7b7569f02c74 [https://perma.cc/D9DG-FMNF]. Cellebrite’s mobile device 
forensics machines cost around $2,500 to $16,000 as of 2015. Peter Stephenson, Cellebrite UFED 
Series Product Review, SC MEDIA (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.scmagazine.com/cellebrite-ufed-
series/review/7046/ [https://perma.cc/TZ9W-77CT]. 
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cities’ police departments already have them.172 
In short: side-channel attacks cost money, time, personnel, expertise, 
and convenience. Law enforcement has yet to “go dark” enough for such 
burdensome undertakings to start looking like a viable option.173 But that 
day is coming. The FBI predicted in 2011 that as encryption becomes 
ubiquitous, most criminals will stay unsophisticated enough to keep getting 
caught, but the agency will occasionally need to craft burdensome 
“individualized solutions” for “very sophisticated target[s]” who encrypt 
their communications (such that not even the third-party carriers can 
decrypt them for law enforcement).174  
At the same time, the development of side-channel attacks keeps pace 
with the current generation of consumer electronics in popular use: from 
CRT monitors175 to flat-screen displays,176 from typewriters177 to iPhones 
and iPads.178 And the attacks keep coming down in price and complexity of 
the equipment involved.179 If law enforcement believes its need to resort to 
“individualized solutions” will increase over time, while the cost and 
complexity of side-channel attacks will continue to decrease, then 
eventually, those two trend lines will intersect. That is the point where 
                                                                                                                          
172 Joseph, supra note 167; Waltman, id.  
173 See Swire, supra note 102. 
174 Pell, supra note 89, at 622 (quoting 2011 congressional testimony of then-FBI general counsel 
Valerie Caproni on the “going dark” issue). “In other words, time, energy, and resources must be 
expended to determine how to acquire data about a specific target that would otherwise readily be 
available from third parties with an appropriate court order without all these additional transaction 
costs.” Id. at 625. 
175 See van Eck, supra note 17.  
176 Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks, supra note 30, at 1, 2 (discussing the popular use of 
flat-screen display devices by consumers). 
177 In the early 1980s, Soviet spies conducted acoustic side-channel attacks against IBM Selectric 
typewriters in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: they bugged the typewriters with tiny microphones that 
allowed them to hear each key struck and thereby determine each individual letter being typed. 
SHARON A. MANEKI, CTR. FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HIST., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, LEARNING FROM THE 
ENEMY: THE GUNMAN PROJECT 1, 14–21 (2012), https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-
heritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/assets/files/gunman-
project/Learning_From_the_Enemy_The_GUNMAN_Project.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7BB-ACJF]. 
178 See ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 2. 
179 In 2012, a key-extraction attack conducted by analyzing mobile devices’ radio-frequency (RF) 
emissions cost $1,000 in equipment. GARY KENWORTHY & PANKAJ ROHATGI, MOBILE DEVICE 
SECURITY: THE CASE FOR SIDE CHANNEL RESISTANCE 1 (2012), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4d1c/e909dfed6d9476cda5a1f546a98388466a4d.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7LPQ-DL76]. In 2016, Genkin et al. demonstrated a “cheap low-bandwidth key 
extraction attack[]” against mobile devices that cost a little over $50 in scavenged or eBay-bought 
equipment, distinguishing it from previous attacks that had “used expensive lab-grade equipment, such 
as oscilloscopes, for their measurements.” ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 1, 16, 18. 
Similarly, the same Genkin team had demonstrated a key-extraction attack against various laptop 
computers in 2015 that “us[ed] simple and readily available equipment, . . . [or,] [a]lternatively, . . . a 
common, consumer-grade radio,” both of which “avoid the expensive equipment used in prior attacks, 
such as low-noise amplifiers, high-speed digitizers, sensitive ultrasound microphones, and professional 
electromagnetic probes.” STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, at 4, 5.  
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side-channel attacks will make the jump from military and intelligence use 
to law enforcement use.  
When side-channel attacks eventually do become a law enforcement 
technique, the first to use them will be federal law enforcement, which, as 
noted, already anticipates the need for tailored solutions for individual 
targets.180 Last year, the FBI asked Congress for over $38 million just to 
develop and acquire tools to counter encryption’s impact on the FBI’s 
information-gathering abilities.181 It is not clear from the request just what 
tools the FBI contemplates, but equipment for side-channel cryptanalysis 
can be interpreted to fall within the category of “cryptanalytic capability” 
tools listed in the request.182 
At the state and local level, where budgets are more constrained, police 
probably won’t deploy side-channel attacks against suspects unless and 
until they become less labor- and resource-intensive. That said, the FBI 
partners with state and local law enforcement agencies around the country 
to conduct digital evidence examinations and give digital forensics 
trainings.183 Those partnerships could extend in future to the FBI’s loaning 
its side-channel attack expertise to state and local police.184  
What is more, state and local law enforcement agencies have a well-
established track record of eventually obtaining technologies that 
originated for military or intelligence use. Defense contractor Harris 
Corporation’s “Stingray” surveillance device, a “cell-site simulator” that 
allows police to extract data from cell phones by mimicking a wireless 
carrier’s cell tower and forcing the phone to connect to it, was originally 
                                                                                                                          
180 See Pell, supra note 89, at 622 (quoting Caproni testimony discussing law enforcement’s 
development of methods to overcome encryption used by criminal targets). 
181 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2017 AUTHORIZATION AND 
BUDGET REQUEST TO CONGRESS 1-1, 2-1, 5-6 (2016) [hereinafter FBI 2017 BUDGET REQUEST], 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/821341/download [https://perma.cc/5JEV-3J9Y] (requesting $38.3 
million “[t]o counter the threat of Going Dark, which includes the inability to access data because of 
challenges related to encryption, mobility, and anonymization. The FBI will develop and acquire tools 
for electronic device analysis, cryptanalytic capability, and forensic tools.”); Lorenzo Franceschi-
Bicchierai, The FBI Wants $38 More Million to Buy Encryption-Breaking Technology, VICE: 
MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 10, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-fbi-wants-
38-million-to-buy-encryption-breaking-technology [https://perma.cc/2RSQ-4RN2]. 
182 See FBI 2017 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 181, at 2-1. 
183 See REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSICS LABORATORY, https://www.rcfl.gov 
[https://perma.cc/U7BF-ERJG] (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); Aliya Sternstein, Hunting for Evidence, 
Secret Service Unlocks Phone Data with Force or Finesse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2017/0202/Hunting-for-evidence-Secret-Service-unlocks-
phone-data-with-force-or-finesse [https://perma.cc/7AVV-TWVX] (describing local police 
departments’ partnership with the Secret Service, which “has become a valuable resource for law 
enforcement units that may not have strong enough decryption tools” to get into smartphones). 
184 See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 30, 33–35 (differing resource levels could 
“lead to the federal government taking over certain kinds of state and local investigations,” depending 
on the workaround needed; not every workaround “require[s] technical expertise and deep pockets” 
like federal law enforcement authorities have). 
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developed for the military and intelligence community.185 Thanks in part to 
grants by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),186 Stingrays and 
other cell-site simulators are now in widespread use by police departments 
around the country187—which have gone to great lengths to keep the details 
secret from the courts, local governments, and the public.188 So, too, 
“mobile X-ray vans” first used in Afghanistan are now in (highly secretive, 
inadequately overseen) use by New York City police “to look through the 
walls of buildings or the sides of trucks.”189  
It thus takes no great stretch of the imagination to envision a near 
future where first the FBI and then garden-variety police departments 
begin adopting the intelligence community’s side-channel techniques for 
circumventing encryption, if the price is right. The equipment for 
conducting side-channel attacks could become the latest device handed 
down to local law enforcement authorities, with the FBI supplying the 
expertise to carry off the attack and DHS (read: taxpayers) footing the bill.  
D. Hypothetical: Investigating a Sophisticated Crypto-Using 
Criminal 
What would a near-future side-channel cryptanalysis operation look 
like? Side-channel attacks are likely to be deployed by law enforcement—
if at all—only in very particular circumstances. Picture a high-value 
criminal target who uses encryption to shield his communications and 
stored data from prying eyes. He also uses a password manager to log into 
his accounts.190 The police have obtained wiretap orders to intercept the 
                                                                                                                          
185 Jeremy Scahill & Margot Williams, Stingrays: A Secret Catalogue of Government Gear for 
Spying on Your Cellphone, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:23 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2015/12/17/a-secret-catalogue-of-government-gear-for-spying-on-your-cellphone/ 
[https://perma.cc/S3A5-K876] (describing how Stingrays work and their military/intelligence origins). 
186 Id. 
187 Joseph, supra note 167 (enumerating city police departments nationwide that have purchased 
cell phone surveillance tools). Joseph’s article describes the unusually powerful “Dirtbox” cell-site 
simulator, which was used by the NSA for mass surveillance in France and which Baltimore police 
have owned since 2012. Id. 
188 Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-phones-shhh-its-
secret.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/73ZK-VWC8]; Daniel Rivero, It’s Now a Trend: Third Court 
Orders the Release of Phone-Tracking Stingray Documents, FUSION (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:46 PM), 
http://fusion.net/story/105521/courts-ordering-the-release-of-stingray-documents-is-now-a-trend/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5AX-UL9L]. 
189 Conor Friedersdorf, The NYPD Is Using Mobile X-Ray Vans to Spy on Unknown Targets, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/411181/ [https://perma.cc/W56N-
2YSD].  
190 A password manager obviates the need to manually enter one’s password when logging into 
one’s accounts. Lucian Constantin, 5 Things You Need to Know about Password Managers, PCWORLD 
(June 18, 2016, 6:34 AM) [hereinafter 5 Things], http://www.pcworld.com/article/3085395/security/5-
things-you-should-know-about-password-managers.html [https://perma.cc/5374-3A55]. A password 
manager can frustrate an attacker’s attempt to learn a target’s account passwords via side-channel 
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target’s communications (such as phone calls, email, and text messages) 
and warrants to search and seize his stored data (such as documents in 
cloud-storage accounts, or emails stored on his email provider’s servers). 
However, they have been able to obtain only minimal, incomplete, or 
irrelevant information from the service providers the suspect uses. 
Intercepting his phone calls, email, and text messages in transit proves 
fruitless, as they are encrypted end-to-end and the police are unsuccessful 
in obtaining plaintext.191 He has turned off backups wherever possible, uses 
a messaging app that does not store copies of messages on its servers,192 
and has encrypted the documents and email he stores on his service 
providers’ servers using a separate, extra layer of encryption beyond that 
built into the service.193 This renders the service providers unable to 
decrypt the stored files for law enforcement.194 
                                                                                                                          
information from his computer display (since the letters are not showing up in cleartext on the screen as 
he types them in), keyboard, or smartphone touchscreen (since he is not tapping in his account 
passwords). See TouchLogger, supra note 15 (discussing smartphone touchscreen side-channel 
attacks); TapLogger, supra note 15 (same); Stealing Pins, supra note 15 (discussing revealing PINs 
using data from smartphone’s motion and orientation sensors); Vuagnoux & Pasini, supra note 35 
(discussing side-channel attacks on keyboards). True, the attacker could learn the master password the 
target uses to log into his password manager. That would be a serious security breach, as the master 
password is a “single point of failure” that would compromise all of the accounts managed by the 
password manager. See 5 Things, supra. But learning the master password is less valuable to a side-
channel attacker if the password manager is the “offline” kind, i.e., it does not sync across devices and 
the master password is never sent to the password management service provider. Id. Even if the 
attacker gleans the master password through a side-channel attack, he won’t be able to log into the 
target’s password manager (and from thence into all the target’s accounts) unless he gains direct 
physical access to the device—in which case the game is already over.  
191 They do succeed sometimes in real investigations, according to the Wiretap Reports 
transmitted annually to Congress by the United States Courts. The reports include information on the 
number of wiretaps where investigators “encountered” encryption (to wit: very, very few) and whether 
they were nevertheless able to obtain plaintext (to wit: sometimes). The reports do not reveal how 
investigators were able to get plaintext in the instances where they succeeded, or what (if any) methods 
they tried that failed. See Wiretap Reports, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/wiretap-reports [https://perma.cc/83CE-TANS] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) 
(repository of annual reports going back to 1997). 
192 Signal works this way. See Micah Lee, Security Tips Every Signal User Should Know, THE 
INTERCEPT (July 2, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/07/02/security-tips-every-signal-
user-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/W33L-DYYQ] (“Unlike other messaging apps, Signal doesn’t 
store a copy of your messages on internet servers (‘in the cloud’).”). 
193 This “belt and suspenders” option adds an extra layer of protection to data in the cloud. As 
discussed, cloud service providers typically can provide user data to law enforcement in plaintext form 
pursuant to a warrant, even if the provider encrypts the stored information. See supra Section I.B.3 & 
note 142. Several programs allow users to encrypt their files before uploading them to cloud storage. 
E.g., Cale Hunt, How to Encrypt Data Before Storing It in the Cloud (and Why You Should), WINDOWS 
CENT. (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.windowscentral.com/how-encrypt-data-storing-it-cloud-
and-why-you-should [https://perma.cc/4EE8-EGXB].  
194 As noted supra in Section II.B.1, “information services” such as cloud storage providers are 
not required by federal law to build law enforcement surveillance capabilities into their systems. 47 
U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2) (2012). And even entities that are so mandated are not responsible for decrypting 
data unless they provided the encryption and have the ability to decrypt the data. Id. § 1002(b)(3).  
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In short, the usual avenues of gathering electronic evidence are closed 
off. But without the target’s unencrypted data and communications, law 
enforcement does not have enough information for a conviction, maybe not 
even enough to show probable cause for an arrest. To keep pursuing this 
investigation, they will need to craft a more individualized approach. 
One rather blunt option with encryption-savvy suspects is to get the 
necessary warrants, then grab the target’s laptop or phone off him in public 
while he is using it.195 If he has his device and accounts open, then he 
already entered his passphrases to unlock them, and the police can access 
his unencrypted data.196 But that may not be feasible: perhaps the target 
rarely appears out in the open using his devices, or he is always covered by 
a bodyguard; perhaps physical interception poses too great a risk to officer 
safety; maybe the police are not willing to give away the existence of the 
investigation yet.  
To get the plaintext, one option is for police to obtain the target’s 
passphrases, or the private encryption keys themselves. Law enforcement 
wants a way to get that information, without touching the target or his 
devices, from enough of a remove that they can operate safely and without 
giving their presence away. Their solution: conduct a side-channel attack 
to obtain the target’s private encryption key. Now the question arises: do 
they need a warrant? If so, and they do not get one, they risk exclusion of 
crucial evidence they see no other way to obtain.197 The next Section 
                                                                                                                          
195 This has happened at least twice. The operator of online black market the Silk Road, Ross 
Ulbricht, shielded his activities by using an encrypted instant messaging program and a full-disk 
encryption program for his laptop. FBI agents worked around those measures by apprehending him in 
October 2013 while he was sitting in a library with his laptop open. The agents created a distraction, 
then grabbed the laptop Ulbricht had been using moments before, pursuant to “orders . . . to seize the 
laptop in an open and unencrypted state.” Sarah Jeong, The Dread Pirate’s Diary, FORBES (Jan. 22, 
2015, 12:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahjeong/2015/01/22/the-dread-pirates-
diary/#1f634c8b37d3 [https://perma.cc/25FA-ULL7]. More recently, Scotland Yard took a page from 
the FBI’s playbook when, late last year, undercover officers from the Metropolitan Police “mugged” a 
suspected credit-card fraudster on the street while he had his iPhone unlocked. Dominic Casciani & 
Gaetan Portal, Phone Encryption: Police “Mug” Suspect to Get Data, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38183819 [https://perma.cc/ZW4P-6ZRR]; see also Encryption 
Workarounds, supra note 60, at 24–26 (discussing these cases as examples of the “access plaintext 
when the device is in use” category of encryption workaround). 
196 The option to compel the target to hand over his encryption keys or passphrases is an unsettled 
legal question, see supra Section II.B.3, and requires the investigation to have progressed far enough 
that police already have the suspect and his devices in custody, which has not yet happened in our 
hypothetical. 
197 The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is intended “to deter 
future Fourth Amendment violations.” United States v. Davis, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011) (citation 
omitted). Notably, there are significant limitations on the suppression remedy in the electronic-
evidence context. Suppression is not an available remedy under the Stored Communications Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2708, 2712 (2012) or the Pen Register Act. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 
(5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 1991). For Wiretap Act 
violations, suppression is available only as to wire and oral communications, not electronic 
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addresses this question.198 
III. APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINES TO SIDE-CHANNEL 
CRYPTANALYSIS 
The courts have yet to define the Fourth Amendment’s scope when it 
comes to the sorts of intrusions implicated in side-channel attacks. These 
intrusions can occur without any physical interference, against computing 
devices not necessarily located within a home or office, to glean 
information that may or may not count as “content” information. Thus, the 
answer to the question of whether side-channel attacks require a warrant is 
every lawyer’s favorite phrase: it depends. This Section quickly reviews 
the Supreme Court’s two rubrics for Fourth Amendment analyses, then 
proceeds to analyze what legal process is required for a particular kind of 
side-channel attack—an electromagnetic key-recovery attack—by asking 
“what,” “where,” and “how.”199 
First, what side-channel information is law enforcement acquiring? 
What legal mechanism (if any) authorizes the seizure of encryption keys 
depends on whether the information counts as “content” information or 
“non-content” information.  
Second, where is the side-channel information being acquired from? 
This Article assumes the information is being obtained from an “end 
point”: the targeted individual’s electronic device, i.e., a cell phone, tablet, 
laptop, or desktop computer. A device has the strongest privacy protection 
when it is inside the home, but a warrant may still be required for side-
channel attacks against devices located outside the home. 
Third, how is law enforcement acquiring the side-channel information? 
Side-channel attacks do not involve any physical trespass, but they 
measure emanations that are typically not detectable by human senses 
unaided. Kyllo v. United States200 supplies the rule for determining whether 
a warrant is needed: Did police use “sense-enhancing technology” “that is 
                                                                                                                          
communications. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
2515). 
198 This hypothetical fact pattern is admittedly abstruse. In the author’s defense, this is a law 
review piece—one that discusses computer security research, which rivals legal academia in its 
propensity for coming up with possible, but unlikely scenarios that have no bearing on the vast 
majority of situations that arise in the real world. See James Mickens, This World of Ours, USENIX 
(Jan. 2014), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7GE-
FMTW] (“Unfortunately, large swaths of the security community are fixated on avant garde horrors . . . 
. [S]ecurity people need to get their priorities straight . . . . In the real world, threat models are much 
simpler.”). And after all, truth has a way of turning out to be stranger than fiction. See Jeong, supra 
note 195 (discussing the saga of the Dread Pirate Roberts). 
199 The Article assumes that the “who” is U.S. law enforcement agents (federal, state, or local) 
investigating a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil for crimes unrelated to terrorism or national security, which are 
extremely complex areas of law out of scope of the Article. 
200 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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not in general public use” to obtain information from a constitutionally-
protected area?201 The Article proposes a set of factors for determining 
whether a technology is “in general public use,” then uses them to analyze 
various side-channel attacks. 
The Section concludes by criticizing current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, particularly the Kyllo “general public use” rule, as 
inadequate to protect Americans’ privacy rights from erosion by 
technological advances. 
A. The Property-Based and Katz v. United States Approaches to the 
Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”202 For a search or seizure to be reasonable, law enforcement 
generally (with certain exceptions) must first get a judicial warrant 
supported by probable cause.203  
For half a century, in determining what counts as a “search” or 
“seizure” necessitating a warrant, courts have relied upon the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test first formulated in Justice Harlan’s famous 
concurrence in Katz v. United States.204 Under Katz, the Fourth 
Amendment is applicable only if the individual seeking its protection had a 
subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that was 
invaded by the state’s action.205  
The Katz test remains the courts’ “lodestar” when evaluating the 
constitutionality of “a particular form of government-initiated electronic 
surveillance.”206 But it is not the only test. Prior to Katz, the Court took an 
“exclusively property-based approach” to the Fourth Amendment, 
informed by the common law of trespass.207 Gradually, the Court came to 
understand that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth 
Amendment violations,”208 eventually proclaiming in Katz that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”209 That is, “a forbidden search 
can occur even when no trespass is involved.”210 The one rubric did not 
                                                                                                                          
201 Id. at 34–35, 40. 
202 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
203 Id.; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). 
204 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
205 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–41 (1979) (citations omitted). 
206 Id. at 739 (footnote omitted). 
207 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (citations omitted). 
208 Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992). 
209 389 U.S. at 351. 
210 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (Noonan, J., dissenting), rev’d, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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replace the other: “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has 
been added to, not substituted for,” the property-centric test.211 
In this century, the Supreme Court has called upon both tests when 
considering the constitutionality of particular forms of information-
gathering by police. Yet the Court’s decisions have somewhat muddied the 
waters by focusing on the intrusions’ location in the sacrosanct space of the 
home in two of three major cases (Kyllo and Jardines), and, in the third 
(Jones), on another physical trespass on property. This complicates the task 
of predicting how courts will rule on future Fourth Amendment challenges 
to warrantless use of non-trespassory side-channel attacks.  
B. What: Content versus Non-Content Information 
What kind of information are police obtaining when they measure EM 
emissions in a side-channel key-recovery attack? The legal process 
required for an electromagnetic key-recovery attack depends on the 
characterization of an encryption key: does it qualify as content or non-
content information? This is an open question as yet unaddressed by the 
courts, but it will be crucial when a court analyzes a key-recovery attack. 
 
1. Are Encryption Keys “Content” or Not? 
 
The courts212 and federal law213 both draw a distinction between 
“content” and “non-content” information. “Content” information means, 
basically, “a message that a person wants to communicate,” whereas “non-
content” information can be characterized as “information about the 
communication that the [communications] network uses to deliver and 
process” the contents of the communication.214 If an encryption key 
                                                                                                                          
211 Jones, 565 U.S. at 409. 
212 “The Supreme Court has . . . forged a clear distinction between” content information, which 
generally is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection (unless some exception applies), and non-content 
information, from which the Court has repeatedly chosen to “expressly withhold[] Fourth Amendment 
protection.” United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “Content” 
is not limited to communications; documents, i.e., personal papers that are not communicated to 
someone else, are also “content.” Id. at 434 n.13 (“[D]ocuments stored on phones and remote servers 
are protected, as ‘content,’ in the same way that the contents of text messages or documents and effects 
stored in a rented storage unit or office are protected.”) (citations omitted). 
213 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
214 Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 (2004) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted) 
[hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide]. ECPA affords greater privacy protections to content information than 
to non-content information “for reasons that most people find intuitive.” See id. (“Actual contents of 
messages naturally implicate greater privacy concerns than information (much of it network-generated) 
about those communications.”). However, the distinction between content and non-content information 
has become extremely blurry, as described in a recent article by several computer security experts. 
Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic 
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qualifies as content information, then its seizure will typically require a 
warrant; not so if it is non-content information,215 though it may still be 
protected under some provision of ECPA.216 
Commentators disagree as to which definition best characterizes 
encryption keys. Some have argued that “[t]he encryption key has no 
communicative . . . content of its own but is merely a tool for deciphering 
the intercepted communication.”217 Lavabit took this stance in the Fourth 
Circuit, maintaining that its SSL keys were not “contents,” but “simply 
cryptographic tools . . . that convey neither meaning nor message.”218 A 
competing perspective counters that “when viewed in totality,” encryption 
keys should be treated like content information because they “change 
content from unreadable to readable text, thereby communicating 
information.”219 That is, the key’s functional aspect (scrambling or 
unscrambling text) does not extinguish its communicative properties.220 
And a third view is that the answer depends on what kind of key is at issue. 
For example, a court could distinguish between an email system’s SSL 
keys and a particular user’s long-term identity key by finding that the latter 
                                                                                                                          
Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 73–79 (2016); see also Mayer, supra note 116 (discussing 
how non-content metadata reveals a pattern of all our activities even without content information). 
215 See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433; In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[c]ommunications content” requires a warrant, but addressing and 
routing information do not) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); United States v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008)).  
216 See United States v. Walker, No. 16-cr-567 (JSR), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38102, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2017) (Title II of ECPA, the Stored Communications Act, largely draws distinctions 
that “track the rule that the contents of communications are generally protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, whereas information principally used in transmitting the information is generally not,” 
with some exceptions) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–87 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3569 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402)). Of course, state laws and constitutions 
also protect the privacy of content and non-content information, sometimes more so than their federal 
counterparts; however, they are out of scope of this Article. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, At the Privacy 
Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939412 
[http://perma.cc/KE75-VPQC] (describing how a new California statute “improves upon” ECPA in its 
“expansiveness and its additional protections”). 
217 Scott Brady, Note, Keeping Secrets: A Constitutional Examination of Encryption Regulation in 
the United States and India, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 325 (2012) (citing Joel C. 
Mandelman, Lest We Walk into the Well: Guarding the Keys - Encrypting the Constitution: To Speak, 
Search & Seize in Cyberspace, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 227, 272–73 (1998)) (discussing encryption 
keys in Fifth Amendment context). 
218 Br. of Appellant at 18, In re Under Seal, Nos. 13-4625(L), 13-4626 (4th Cir. Oct. 10, 2013), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/804263/lavabit-opening-brief-filed-
version.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y4Q-2FVS] [hereinafter Lavabit Brief] (citing ECPA’s definition of 
“contents,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012)).  
219 Wilson, Compelling Passwords, supra note 146, at 21 & n.112 (acknowledging “the 
uncertainty of whether passwords [and keys] are content or non-content data”). The article uses the 
term “password” to include “encryption keys.” Id. at 3 n.1. 
220 See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141–42 (holding that encryption software source code’s functional 
aspects could not “overwhelm[] any constitutional protections that expression might otherwise enjoy”). 
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communicates that the user is who she claims to be and the message she is 
sending is authentic,221 while the former communicate nothing. 
Given these conflicting arguments, it is not clear how a court would 
rule in a case involving the seizure of private encryption keys. If the court 
deems them to be non-content information, then as said, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require police to get a warrant, although some form 
of process may be required by statute.222 If the court holds that the keys are 
content information, that does not end the analysis: the court still must ask 
where and how police conducted the key-extraction attack.  
 
2. What Legal Process Authorizes the Seizure of Encryption Keys? 
 
Whether encryption keys are content or non-content guides what legal 
process (if any) is required to seize them. When investigators seek a 
target’s encryption keys in order to access evidence in plaintext, “finding 
the key often requires the legal authority to search for and seize it.”223 For 
the seizure of encryption keys, that legal authority is not clear-cut, and 
which authority applies requires careful examination of exactly what it is 
that law enforcement wishes to seize.  
 
a. Search Warrants 
 
                                                                                                                          
221 See Felten, supra note 21, at 3, 4 (“A party can use its long-term identity key to prove its 
identity to other parties,” and a malicious actor who learns that key could impersonate the user). 
222 See supra notes 205–12 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment also affords no protection to “information [someone] voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
(1976). The third-party doctrine should not apply to private encryption keys. A user’s private device 
and long-term identity keys are not transmitted to third parties. See supra notes 21, 22 and 
accompanying text. Session keys for encrypting messages are exchanged only between the two parties 
to the communication. See Felten, supra note 21, at 3 (session keys are “known only to the two of 
them”). That is, they are not disclosed to the encrypted communications service provider. “Without a 
third party, the third party doctrine is inapplicable.” United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 
614–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (unlike cell-site location information “pings” voluntarily transmitted by 
phones to cell network, location information involuntarily transmitted by phone directly to 
government’s cell-site simulator was not subject to third-party doctrine).  
The Lavabit case is not to the contrary. Lavabit architected its service so that it held the “single 
set of [private and public] SSL keys for all its various subscribers.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 
280 (4th Cir. 2014). Lavabit’s users “never had access to those private keys.” Lavabit Brief, supra note 
218, at 22. That is, Lavabit was not a “third party” to whom its users turned over their private keys. 
And anyway, there is no need to resort to a side-channel attack if a provider holds the encryption keys 
police seek. As they did with Lavabit, police can try to demand the keys directly from the service 
provider. That implicates different legal issues than does seizure from the user. See Encryption 
Workarounds, supra note 60, at 15–16; see generally When the Cops Come A-Knocking, supra note 
149 (reviewing law enforcement’s authority to demand various kinds of information or assistance from 
third-party service providers). 
223 Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 11. 
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The Fourth Amendment permits warrants to issue only upon probable 
cause224 to believe that the search will turn up “fruits, instrumentalities, or 
evidence of a crime.”225 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which 
governs the issuance of warrants, enumerates similar categories of property 
subject to search and seizure.226  
Encryption keys do not fit comfortably within these categories. In 
appealing a seizure warrant, encrypted email service provider Lavabit227 
argued that there was no probable cause to seize its private SSL encryption 
keys.228 Its keys were not fruits, instrumentalities, evidence (either of a 
crime or for impeachment), or contraband.229 Nor are encryption keys 
designed or intended for criminal use: encryption programs are legal and 
general-purpose.230 There is thus an argument that the Fourth Amendment 
and Rule 41 do not authorize the seizure of encryption keys.231  
All the same, Lavabit’s facts will not apply in every case. Depending 
on the specific facts presented in a warrant application, a court might 
decide that even if an encryption key is not evidence, fruit, or contraband, 
it is an instrumentality of a crime (e.g., possession of child pornography), 
and conclude that seizure with a warrant is proper.232 The government, for 
its part, appears to find the propriety of a warrant to be uncontroversial: the 
DOJ’s model electronic-evidence warrant includes encryption keys in the 
                                                                                                                          
224 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
225 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 549–50 (1978). 
226 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (authorizing the search or seizure only of property that is “evidence of a 
crime,” “contraband, fruits of a crime, or other items illegally possessed,” or “designed for use, 
intended for use, or used in committing a crime”). We assume a federal investigation governed by 
federal procedural rules because side-channel attacks are more likely to be the province of federal 
investigators than of state or local authorities. See Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 30, 33–
35.  
227 See supra Section II.B.3. 
228 Lavabit Brief, supra note 218, at 20–24; see also When the Cops Come A-Knocking, supra 
note 149 (noting, in slides 23 through 25, that encryption keys are not evidence of a crime or 
contraband, discussing the Lavabit seizure warrant, and concluding that it is unknown whether a 
warrant can be used to compel keys’ disclosure to police). 
229 Id. at 20, 22–23 (citing Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 549–50). The Fourth Circuit declined on 
procedural grounds to rule on the merits of this argument. In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 285–86. 
230 See supra Section II.A. 
231 Cf. In re Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 
135 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 require “probable cause to believe 
that the information sought is itself evidence of a crime,” not that it is merely “relevant to an 
investigation” or “can be expected to produce admissible evidence”). This opinion has been critiqued 
for “read[ing] more into Rule 41 than was intended.” In re Application of the U.S. of Am., 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 571, 581 (W.D. Tex. 2010). 
232 Cf. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577–78, 581 (D.N.J. 2001) (upholding 
investigators’ use of keystroke logger, which “was devised by F.B.I. engineers using previously 
developed techniques in order to obtain a target’s key and key-related information,” to get passphrase 
to encrypted computer file) (discussed in Encryption Workarounds, supra note 60, at 10–11). 
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sample list of items to be seized.233 
 
b. ECPA 
 
ECPA is the federal statutory framework that primarily governs 
electronic surveillance.234 It provides several means for law enforcement to 
obtain “content” information about communications. The Wiretap Act 
(Title I of ECPA) governs seizures of the contents of “electronic 
communications” in transit;235 the Stored Communications Act (SCA) 
(Title II of ECPA) governs seizures of contents in electronic storage.236  
It is questionable whether these provisions should apply to seizure of 
encryption keys. Private keys arguably do not count as “electronic 
communications” or “contents” thereof. An “electronic communication” 
entails a “transfer” of information over a “system that affects interstate or 
foreign commerce” (such as the internet).237 But private encryption keys 
should never be transmitted over such a system.238 And an individual’s 
computer or smartphone is not itself such a “system,” even if it connects to 
one.239 Lavabit raised this argument in its appeal, but the Fourth Circuit did 
not reach its merits, leaving the issue undecided.240 
On the other hand, the exchange of session keys for encrypting 
communications does entail such a system, making that exchange look like 
an “electronic communication.”241 A court might conclude that it is, but 
that session keys are not content information. If so, it could authorize the 
side-channel seizure under the Pen Register Act (Title III of ECPA)—
provided it also finds that session keys count as “dialing, routing, 
                                                                                                                          
233 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations, EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT’YS 1 app. at 249 (2009). 
234 Since ECPA’s enactment, “electronic surveillance has been governed primarily, not by 
decisions of [the Supreme] Court, but by the [ECPA] statute, which authorizes but imposes detailed 
restrictions on electronic surveillance.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
235 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012). 
236 Id. § 2703(a), (b). 
237 Id. § 2510(12) (“[E]lectronic communication” means “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce”). 
See also id. § 2510(8) (“contents” of a wire, oral, or electronic communication means “any information 
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication”). 
238 See supra notes 21, 22 and accompanying text. 
239 United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837–38 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (noting the Act’s 
definition of “electronic communications” applies only to data that is in fact being transmitted beyond a 
local computer by a system that affects interstate commerce). 
240 In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 275, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2014). Lavabit contended that the SCA did 
not authorize a warrant to seize its private SSL keys on the grounds they were not “electronic 
communications” under ECPA, since there is never any “transfer” or “transmission” of Lavabit’s 
private keys. Lavabit Brief, supra note 218, at 18–19.  
241 See Felten, supra note 21, at 3. 
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addressing, or signaling information.”242 This seems doubtful: the purpose 
of a session key is to protect a message’s confidentiality and integrity,243 
not help deliver the message it encrypts. If the court concluded, though, 
that the session keys are “contents,” it could then authorize a wiretap order 
allowing the interception of session keys as they are being exchanged 
between the target and the target’s interlocutor.244  
In sum, the content/non-content distinction is a crux of the legal 
analysis of an electromagnetic key-extraction attack, and courts must 
carefully consider the particular type(s) of encryption key sought to be 
seized.245 
C. Where: Side-Channel Attacks and Constitutionally-Protected Areas  
A Fourth Amendment analysis of a side-channel attack must also take 
into account where the end point being targeted is located and where the 
police (and their equipment) are located. The modern understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment since Katz is that it “protects people, not places.”246 
Nevertheless, the property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
remains a viable doctrine, available whenever the police accomplish a 
trespassory intrusion on privacy.247  
The Supreme Court’s application of the property-based and Katz 
doctrines has been confusing. The home has always held a special place in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, making it the “most commonly litigated 
                                                                                                                          
242 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 3127(3) (defining “pen register” as “a device or process which records or 
decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility 
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such 
information shall not include the contents of any communication”). 
243 See Felten, supra note 21, at 3, 4. 
244 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (authorizing interception of electronic communications); id. § 2510(4) 
(“‘[I]ntercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”).  
245 Content/non-content distinctions among different types of encryption keys could create 
practical headaches for investigators. An electromagnetic side-channel key-extraction attack could 
putatively sweep in several kinds of key; if some are “content” and others not, investigators risk 
exceeding the authorization issued by the court. For example, a pen register order does not allow the 
collection of content information. See id. § 3127(3). A court challenge might necessitate an in-depth 
analysis of how the attack worked, how the attack equipment was configured, and exactly what 
information it did or did not collect. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 575, 581–82 (carefully analyzing 
whether keystroke logger intercepted wire communications, where agents had obtained search warrants 
but not a wiretap order). Out of caution, investigators who do not know beforehand what information 
their side-channel attack will yield might choose to apply for a wiretap order, despite the heightened 
showing this would require. See In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (setting forth ECPA’s four broad categories of electronic 
surveillance, “arranged from highest to lowest legal process for obtaining court approval”). 
246 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
247 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for,” the property-based rubric). 
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area of protected privacy.”248 In its “incoherent” jurisprudence on cases 
involving “sense-enhancing” surveillance, the Court appears to apply “a 
more searching review” to techniques that intrude on the home than to 
those that do not.249 More generally, whether a physical trespass occurred 
“often seems determinative” in these cases.250  
In Kyllo v. United States251 and the more-recent Florida v. Jardines,252 
the Court found warrantless searches of the home using sense-enhancing 
“devices” to be unconstitutional. In both cases, the home seemed to be the 
dispositive factor, regardless of which rubric—Katz or property—the Court 
was nominally applying. Similarly, in United States v. Jones,253 the Court 
held unconstitutional the warrantless use of a GPS device affixed to a 
vehicle—because it intruded on property.254 Jones clarified that the Katz 
analysis applies to non-trespassory electronic surveillance,255 but left for 
another day how the Fourth Amendment would play out in the case of a 
non-trespassory intrusion upon privacy interests outside of the home.256  
This lack of guidance complicates the task of analyzing the use of side-
channel key-recovery attacks against end-point devices. A warrant is 
typically required when police monitor electronic devices that are inside a 
home, but Kyllo creates an exception. Outside the home, a warrant may 
also be required, but arriving at that answer is not straightforward. How the 
attack is conducted proves highly important in both situations. 
 
1. Side-Channel Attacks Against Devices in Constitutionally-
Protected Areas 
The Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”257 Nevertheless, 
the law places the home at the apex of Fourth Amendment protection.258 In 
Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when law enforcement 
agents use “sense-enhancing technology” to measure emissions from a 
                                                                                                                          
248 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
249 David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment, 
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 467–70 (2007) [hereinafter Steinberg]. Steinberg argued that “the 
Fourth Amendment has no applicability to the vast majority of sense-enhanced searches” and that the 
Supreme Court’s “arbitrary and inconsistent” decisions in such cases underscore the need for this area 
to be regulated instead by statute. Id. at 466–67. 
250 Steinberg, supra note 249, at 468. 
251 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
252 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013). 
253 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
254 Id. at 404, 412.  
255 Id. at 411. 
256 Id. at 412. 
257 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
258 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 
U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (privacy expectations are at their height in a private home)). 
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home, they must get a warrant.259 That rule applies to side-channel attacks 
on devices that are located inside homes, and should extend to devices in 
similar constitutionally-protected spaces such as offices as well. 
In Kyllo, federal agents had warrantlessly used a thermal imaging 
device to scan the Kyllo home from their position on a public street.260 The 
Court ruled the scan an unconstitutional warrantless search.261 While 
applying Katz, the Court also emphasized the “firm,” “bright” line the 
Fourth Amendment draws around the home.262 It held that “obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the 
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search—
at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public 
use.”263 In an age of rapid technological change, the Court observed, the 
nation’s federal courts must be prepared to prevent police technology from 
eroding the Fourth Amendment’s privacy guarantees.264 
Kyllo also held that the “made public” and “plain view” doctrines did 
not foreclose Fourth Amendment protection. Generally, the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office.”265 Kyllo rejected the application of 
this doctrine to waste heat emitted from a home, upending several 
appellate-court decisions to the contrary.266 It also rejected the applicability 
of the “plain view” doctrine, which applies to contraband left in plain view 
or discarded trash set out by the curb, to a home’s waste heat emissions.267  
Subsequently, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court held unconstitutional a 
warrantless drug dog sniff on a defendant’s front porch.268 The Court again 
                                                                                                                          
259 Id. at 34; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419, 1425 (2013). 
260 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30. 
261 Id. at 34–35. 
262 Id. at 34–35, 40. 
263 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
264 Id. at 34 (courts must define “what limits there are upon th[e] power of technology to shrink 
the realm of guaranteed privacy,” and must not “permit police technology to erode the privacy 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”). 
265 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
266 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases from the Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits), rev’d, 553 U.S. 27 (2001). The four-justice dissent in Kyllo 
took this position as well, contending that a thermal-imaging device merely captures heat “waves 
emanating from a private area into the public domain.” 553 U.S. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The 
majority rejected this “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment” as inconsistent with Katz, 
wherein “the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone 
booth.” Id. at 35. 
267 Id. at 37–38 (residence’s warmth was an “intimate detail[] of the home”); see also id. at 42–43, 
44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) & Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). 
268 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413, 1417–18 (2013). 
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stressed the Fourth Amendment primacy of the home and its curtilage.269 
But unlike in Kyllo, the Court based its decision not on Katz, but on the 
property-based rubric of the Fourth Amendment.270 Thus, the longstanding 
police use of drug-sniffing dogs as a “‘sense-enhancing’ tool” was not 
determinative; rather, the physical intrusion onto property was key.271 
Kyllo and Jardines both involved the home, but they need not be 
limited to it. The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search 
someone’s office or hotel room, too.272 That is because, although the home 
is “first among equals,”273 the Fourth Amendment nevertheless 
“safeguard[s] individuals from unreasonable government invasions of 
legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the 
four walls of the home.”274 Accordingly, police obtain warrants when they 
wish to search or seize computers from the constitutionally-protected 
spaces of offices and hotel rooms.275 That is consistent with both the 
trespass-based approach to the Fourth Amendment (relied on in 
Jardines)276 and the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy framework 
(relied on in Kyllo).277 Therefore, despite the two cases’ confusing 
emphasis on the special role of the home, this Article assumes that a court 
would extend Kyllo and Jardines to the constitutionally-protected spaces 
inside offices and hotel rooms.278  
                                                                                                                          
269 Id. at 1414, 1417–18 (home is “first among equals” under the Fourth Amendment). 
270 Id. at 1414 (property-based approach “renders this case a straightforward one”). 
271 Id. at 1417, 1419 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40). 
272 Id. at 10–11 (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (hotel room); G.M. Leasing 
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (office); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) 
(office)). 
273 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
274 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1977) (citations and footnote omitted) (listing 
spaces requiring a warrant to search, including sealed packages and envelopes sent through the mail, 
public phone booths, hotel rooms, offices, and automobiles on private premises or in police custody), 
abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
275 See United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (federal agents executed a 
search warrant on defendant’s hotel room and seized a laptop computer, which defendant had used to 
share child pornography over peer-to-peer networks that he accessed online from hotel rooms across 
the country); Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (police obtained warrants to enter Scarfo’s business office 
and install a keylogger on his computer there). 
276 See Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51–52 (holding, pre-Katz, that warrantless search of hotel room 
violated its occupants’ Fourth Amendment rights; because the occupants “were not even present when 
the entry, search and seizure were conducted,” the agents’ “intrusion was conducted surreptitiously and 
by means denounced as criminal”). 
277 A hotel guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her hotel room. Stoner v. California, 
376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). 
278 The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion examining the constitutionality of a drug dog 
sniff in the hallway outside the unfortunately-named defendant Legall’s hotel room, rejected both a 
Jardines argument that the hallway was within the curtilage of the hotel room and, consequently, a 
Kyllo argument that the trained drug-sniffing dog was a “device not in general public use” that 
infringed on his legitimate expectation of privacy. United States v. Legall, 585 F. App’x 4, 5–6 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 410 (2005)). On that rationale, 
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Kyllo and Jardines apply readily to law enforcement side-channel 
attacks when the targeted electronic device is in someone’s home or office. 
Devices’ EM emissions and the equipment to measure them are 
comparable to the waste heat and thermal-imaging device in Kyllo.279 EM 
emissions happen without any volitional action, or probably even 
awareness, on the device owner’s part, meaning they are not “knowingly 
expose[d] to the public”280 and do not fit the “plain view” standard. Even if 
she knows about the emissions, the device’s owner may reasonably expect 
that “‘observ[ing]’ [EM emissions] emanating from [the device] requires 
sophisticated equipment that a trash picker probably does not have.”281  
In short, under Kyllo, when a device in a home or office throws off EM 
emissions into the open air, it is “not determinative” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes “that information is made publicly available, at least 
where access requires technology”—as recovering encryption keys from 
EM emissions assuredly does.282 
Consequently, the use of EM emission-measuring equipment against a 
device inside a home or office indisputably requires a warrant if police 
physically intrude on the property to conduct the attack, as in Jardines 
(because the property rubric applies). If the device is inside a protected 
space but police carry out the side-channel attack from a public vantage 
point (i.e., without a physical trespass), Kyllo and the Katz test require 
them to get a warrant—unless the police’s device is in general public use, a 
variable explored in Section III.E below.283   
2. Side-Channel Attacks Against Devices Outside of Protected Areas 
Kyllo and Jardines demonstrate that both Fourth Amendment rubrics 
can protect privacy interests inside the home. What, then, is the proper test 
when police conduct a non-trespassory side-channel attack to measure the 
                                                                                                                          
narrow hallways in hotels or office buildings might be a boon to law enforcement agents conducting 
side-channel attacks, as a thin or nonexistent curtilage is compatible with the very close proximity that 
electromagnetic side-channel attacks presently require. 
279 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (“Thermal imagers detect infrared 
radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye.”). “Infrared 
radiation is a type of electromagnetic radiation.” Jim Lucas, What Is Infrared?, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 26, 
2015, 2:52 AM), http://www.livescience.com/50260-infrared-radiation.html [https://perma.cc/8B6K-
C9R5] (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).  
280 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
281 Stephen A. LaFleur, Kyllo v. United States: Something Old, Nothing New; Mostly Borrowed, 
What To Do?, 62 LA. L. REV. 929, 946 (2002).  
282 Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party 
Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 440 (2012) [hereinafter Henderson, After Jones]. 
283 For now, the physical-trespass situation is more likely. As described earlier, EM key-recovery 
attacks presently work only at very close distances, meaning the sensing equipment likely would need 
to be located right up against the wall of the home. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text. Law 
enforcement agents would have to either be on the property during the attack, or at least enter onto it in 
order to place their equipment there before retreating off the property to carry the attack out. 
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emissions from an electronic device that is not in a protected space such as 
the target’s home or office (e.g., a laptop in use in a cafe)? The Supreme 
Court has stated that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
applies to non-trespassory electronic surveillance. Kyllo’s “sense-
enhancing technology not in general public use” rule should extend to this 
context, too, though the Court has not clarified whether it does so.  
a. The Katz Framework Applies to Non-Trespassory Side-
Channel Attacks 
The 2012 Supreme Court case United States v. Jones284 clarified that 
the Katz rule governs novel “nontrespassory surveillance techniques” for 
search and seizure of information.285 In Jones, police physically mounted a 
GPS tracking device on a vehicle and tracked its movements for 28 days.286 
The Court unanimously agreed that this was a search, but not why.287  
The majority opinion based its reasoning on the GPS installation’s 
physical intrusion on the defendant’s “effect”—the vehicle.288 It applied 
the property-based Fourth Amendment rubric, vigorously rejecting the idea 
that the Katz test had replaced it.289  
In concurring opinions, multiple justices expressed doubts about the 
property-based rubric’s applicability in situations of non-trespassory 
electronic surveillance.290 In response, the majority opinion clarified that 
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”291 
Jones establishes that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
framework applies to the novel non-trespassory electronic surveillance 
method of electromagnetic key-extraction attacks. Therefore, if a device’s 
                                                                                                                          
284 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
285 Id. at 953–54; see also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
286 Id. at 948–49. 
287 Id. at 949. Compare id. at 954 (majority opinion) (the installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle constituted trespass, and therefore a physical intrusion), with id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Government obtained personal information without a valid warrant and 
without the respondent’s consent, and therefore invaded the respondent’s property interests), and id. at 
964 (Alito, J., concurring) (opining that the lengthy monitoring of vehicle’s movements violated the 
defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy). 
288 Id. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
289 Id. at 950–51, 953. 
290 Justice Alito’s concurring opinion pointed out that the majority’s trespass-based framework 
did not adequately account for “cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as 
opposed to physical, contact.” Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor agreed with him, 
cautioning in her own separate concurrence that the trespass rubric would be of little help in cases 
involving “electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion 
on property.” Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
291 Id. at 953; see also id. at 954 (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some 
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; 
but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
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owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information revealed 
by the device’s EM emissions, then a non-trespassory side-channel attack 
on those emissions will require a warrant.292 
b. Privacy Protections for Electronic Devices and Their Contents 
The Fourth Amendment is not read narrowly to protect only “the 
catalog (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’)” of categories its text 
enumerates.293 “[E]ffects” encompasses the closed containers that hold 
them.294 Computers and smartphones are analogous (if imperfectly) to 
containers as electronic “repositor[ies] of personal effects.”295 Several 
appeals courts have extended the “container” analogy to computers,296 
finding them generally subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.297  
In addition, the amount and sensitivity of the personal information in 
those “containers” gives rise to an independent layer of protection for that 
data, even if an exception applies that would otherwise subject the 
container to a warrantless search. Because our cell phones provide “a 
digital record of nearly every aspect of [our] lives,” the Supreme Court 
held in Riley v. California that a warrant is required for searches of cell 
phones incident to arrest.298 Ordinarily, closed containers found on an 
arrestee’s person may be searched without a warrant.299 But our phones are 
not like other “containers,” an analogy the Court viewed skeptically.300 
                                                                                                                          
292 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing a two-
part reasonableness test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy exists). 
293 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). 
294 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (holding that a warrant was needed to search 
a locked footlocker, because someone who manifests an expectation of privacy by “placing personal 
effects inside a double-locked footlocker” is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection “[n]o less than 
one who locks the doors of his home against intruders”). 
295 Id. at 13. 
296 E.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718–19 (10th Cir. 2007) (deciding to categorize 
computers alongside suitcases and footlockers); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402–04 (4th Cir. 
2001) (analogizing password-protected files on a shared computer to the footlocker in Chadwick).  
297 E.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Individuals generally 
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers.”) (citations omitted); Guest v. 
Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Home owners would of course have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy … in their belongings — including computers — inside the home.”). For a discussion of a 
“device-centric” theory of Fourth Amendment privacy, see Jonathan Mayer, Constitutional Malware 
19–21 & nn.58–68 (Nov. 14, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2633247 
[https://perma.cc/A6B8-7KJJ]. 
298 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2472, 2473, 2479, 2491 (2014). 
299 Id. at 2483–84 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 
(1973)). 
300 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (calling analogy “a bit strained”). At worst, the Court thought the 
analogy wholly inapt with regard to data that police view locally on a phone but that is stored remotely 
in the cloud. Id. The prevalence of cloud storage illustrated the analogy’s shortcomings: containers may 
be searched incident to arrest, but Riley established that electronic devices are not subject to that 
exception, in part because of the possibility that some information that is viewable on a phone is in fact 
stored remotely. Id. The Court’s recognition of the container analogy’s limitations is noteworthy and 
laudable. Unfamiliar technologies may prompt judges to draw analogies to the familiar physical 
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Rather, it concluded that police must get a warrant due to the “broad array 
of private information” our cell phones reveal about us.301 
In short, people generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
against the warrantless search and seizure of their electronic devices and 
the information they contain, irrespective of whether the device is located 
inside or outside the home.302  
c. Extending the Kyllo Rule to Side-Channel Attacks on Devices 
Outside Constitutionally-Protected Areas 
In an electromagnetic key-recovery attack, agents seize an encryption 
key by measuring side-channel information emitted by an electronic 
device, without physically seizing the device to obtain information from it. 
Such non-trespassory surveillance is evaluated under the Katz “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” framework.303 There is generally a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against warrantless electronic surveillance of 
devices and their contents.304 Since a device’s owner has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the device and the information its EM emissions 
reveal, it follows that a non-trespassory side-channel attack should 
generally require a warrant, no matter where the device is located. 
However, under Kyllo, police must get a warrant to use “sense-
enhancing technology” such as side-channel attack equipment only if the 
device is not “in general public use”—at least as to surveillance of the 
home.305 Should this rule extend to EM side-channel attacks against 
devices in a public place, which involve no intrusion into the home or 
seizure of the device itself? 
On the one hand, it is challenging to know how to apply Kyllo outside 
the home. The opinion focuses heavily on the home, but not in a 
                                                                                                                          
world—which, if inapt, can lead to flawed legal outcomes and poor public-policy choices. Orin S. Kerr, 
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 875–76 (2004). 
301 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491, 2485 (“[Cell phones] place vast quantities of personal information 
literally in the hands of individuals”), 2494–95 (“[w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal, they 
hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”) (citation omitted).  
302 This expectation does not turn on whether the device’s owner “locks” it by encrypting and/or 
password-protecting it. Such measures’ legal effect is unsettled. Compare Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403 
(“By using a password, Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude [the computer’s other user] and 
others from his personal files. . . . Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the password-
protected computer files and . . ., therefore, has alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”), 
with Rozenshtein, supra note 61, at *30 (“one scholarly debate asks whether merely encrypting a 
communication is enough to raise a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, thus triggering Fourth 
Amendment protections”) (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption 
Create a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2001) (positing that 
“encryption cannot create Fourth Amendment protection”)). 
303 See supra Section III.C.2.a. 
304 See supra Section III.C.2.b. 
305 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
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particularly coherent way that would guide its application outside that 
context. Professor Henderson believes that Kyllo’s fixation on the home 
and its special role, while failing to engage directly with the legal 
consequences (under the third-party doctrine) of Kyllo’s failure to block 
the radiation emanating from his home, “renders the entire opinion of 
questionable significance outside the context of the home.”306  
Yet there is a strong argument that Kyllo should extend to side-channel 
attacks that measure EM emissions from devices in public spaces. This 
seems intuitively correct given that Kyllo itself involved the measurement 
of side-channel information.307 A side-channel attack on an electronic 
device in public is like the thermal imaging of the Kyllo home: it is a non-
trespassory intrusion, conducted from a public vantage point, to measure 
information that is protected as private,308 from something that is 
constitutionally protected (the container-like electronic device here, the 
home in Kyllo). 
Further, if we apply the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
(as Kyllo did and as Jones requires), Katz itself is also closely analogous. A 
device that collects EM emissions radiated from a target’s computer or cell 
phone in public is similar to the eavesdropping device that picked up sound 
waves emitted from the phone booth in Katz.309 It did not matter to the 
Court that Katz made his calls from a glass-walled phone booth in public: 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”310 so it “nonetheless 
protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because he ‘justifiably 
relied’ upon the privacy of the telephone booth.”311  
Just as someone who goes into a phone booth and closes the door 
behind him before placing a call “is surely entitled to assume that the 
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world,”312 
someone discreetly using a laptop or cell phone in public may reasonably 
                                                                                                                          
306 Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of 
Fourth Amendment Speech, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 540–44 (2004) (calling the opinion “far from a 
model of judicial clarity,” leaving it “questionable what [the five-justice majority] would hold outside 
the context of the home”). 
307 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29 (“infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not 
visible to the naked eye”). 
308 Private encryption keys, which a court could deem particularly sensitive in keeping with 
Riley’s concern with not just the quantity, but also the sensitive quality of the information that our 
electronic devices hold about us. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (“[C]ertain types of data are also 
qualitatively different.”). A court might view encryption keys as especially sensitive information 
because encryption is what protects from snooping eyes the other kinds of private and sensitive 
information that concerned the Riley Court. See id. (listing, e.g., Internet browsing history revealing 
searches for disease symptoms, and apps that would reveal political and religious affiliations, addiction, 
pregnancy, and personal budget details). 
309 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36. 
310 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
311 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353). 
312 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
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expect that police are not surreptitiously spying on that usage. This is 
doubly true of the electromagnetic emissions that reveal encryption keys. 
Even if a cell phone’s user could not reasonably expect his WhatsApp 
phone call to remain private if he conducted it loudly on speaker-phone 
while strolling down the main thoroughfare, this behavior (though 
obnoxious) does nothing to expose the app’s secret encryption keys to the 
public. Those, he may reasonably expect will remain private.  
Extending Kyllo to spaces outside the home also avoids an absurd 
result. Kyllo creates an exception to the warrant requirement for use of 
sense-enhancing technology to measure otherwise-private information 
about the interior of a home, where the technology is “in general public 
use.”313 But as noted, people generally have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their cell phones and laptops wherever they may be. It would 
make little sense for a device to be subject to the Kyllo exception while it is 
inside the home, where the Fourth Amendment’s protection is supposedly 
at its zenith, but receive more robust protection once it leaves the home. 
Kyllo’s “general public use” rule thus should extend to side-channel 
attacks against devices when they are in public spaces, not just in the 
home. Adapted for electronic devices, the Kyllo test reads: where the 
government uses sense-enhancing technology that is not in general public 
use, to explore details of an electronic device that would previously have 
been unknowable without a physical intrusion into the device, the 
surveillance constitutes a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant.314 
An electromagnetic key-recovery attack seeks to learn information for 
purposes of extracting private keys from an electronic device (and, 
ultimately, obtaining plaintext using the extracted keys). That information 
“would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”;315 
that is, direct physical access to the device—hence the need for a side-
channel attack.316 Accordingly, if the side-channel attack uses a sense-
enhancing device that is not in general public use, the police must get a 
warrant. If the device is in general public use, no warrant is necessary. The 
next Section delves into the “general public use” analysis. 
E. How: Analyzing Sense-Enhancing Side-Channel Key-Recovery 
Equipment under the Kyllo “General Public Use” Test 
Just how law enforcement agents carry out a side-channel attack is a 
critical final step in the Fourth Amendment analysis. Stated simply, when 
                                                                                                                          
313 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
314 See id. at 34, 40. 
315 Id. at 40. 
316 See supra Section II.D. 
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the how of non-trespassory surveillance means using a “sense-enhancing 
technology” that is “not in general public use,” Kyllo says the police must 
get a warrant.317  
In announcing this rule, the Court strove to “take the long view” of the 
Fourth Amendment in light of technological advances.318 It refused to 
“leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology,” noting that 
while the thermal imaging device at issue “was relatively crude, the rule 
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already 
in use or in development.”319  
Nevertheless, the rule Kyllo announced is very fact-dependent, and its 
outcome can change over time as society acclimates to new technologies. 
Attacks that measure side-channel information such as minute vibrations, 
sounds inaudible to the human ear, or electromagnetic emissions not on the 
visible spectrum,320 indisputably require “sense-enhancing” equipment. But 
yesterday’s “sophisticated system” is tomorrow’s “crude” tool. That is, a 
device that was “not in general public use” at the time Kyllo was decided 
would not necessarily still qualify as such today, and what qualifies today 
may come into “general public use” in the future.  
1. What Makes a Device “in General Public Use”? 
The side-channel attack technologies discussed in Section I doubtless 
enhance the human senses under Kyllo. But not every “sense-enhancing 
technology” is “not in general public use.” What, then, makes a device “in 
general public use”? Commentators have suggested several factors to be 
taken into account: cost, availability, legal restrictions, consumer choice, 
and social norms. 
According to commentator Stephen A. LaFleur, “[g]eneral public use 
is a function of cost, availability, and the lack of statutory restrictions on 
possession.”321 These factors are intertwined: “[g]iven the cost trends in 
consumer electronic devices,” greater affordability of a device will lead to 
greater availability, but “government restriction” will hinder availability.322 
Professor Stephen E. Henderson suggested factors akin to LaFleur’s, 
but added social norms.323 The Kyllo “general public use” test, intersecting 
as it does with the Katz “reasonable expectation” test, refers to what 
behaviors society considers normal and expected, not what behaviors are 
                                                                                                                          
317 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
318 Id. at 40. 
319 Id. at 35–36 (footnote omitted). 
320 Professor Steinberg points out that the sense the thermal-imaging device amplified in Kyllo by 
measuring infrared radiation was that of touch (to detect heat), not sight. Steinberg, supra note 249, at 
469–70. 
321 LaFleur, supra note 281, at 945. 
322 Id. 
323 Henderson, After Jones, supra note 282, at 440, 445. 
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possible. That is, Kyllo “look[s] not to what persons could do, but to what 
they actually do.”324 What behavior is normal, though, is determined in 
part by statutory strictures, i.e., “what the law permits and prohibits.”325 
Thus, whether a device is “in general public use” “will depend not solely 
upon developments in technology and consumer choice, but also upon any 
statutory restrictions on the sale or use of such devices.”326  
Cost, legality, and availability are clearly fundamental, as Professor 
Henderson and LaFleur agree. But “availability” and “social norms” are 
concepts with some subtlety to them. For example, “community band” 
(CB) radios are available from Radio Shack,327 but they are used mainly by 
truckers; most people nowadays just use cell phones.328 Yet thanks to 
Smokey and the Bandit, the general public knows about CB radios.329 
Consequently, even if a device is only “in general public use” within a 
particular market or community (anymore), the general public’s awareness 
of the device should factor into the Katz/Kyllo analysis. 
What is more, “availability” and “social norms” interact in an 
unexpected way when common components are repurposed to an 
uncommon end. For example, well-known (fictional) government agent 
MacGyver could use his Swiss army knife to cobble together a working 
proof-of-concept from whatever ordinary items he had at hand, and use it 
to save the day.330 His end device was not “available” by itself, even if its 
components were common. Plus, the audience was supposed to find his 
creation a remarkable accomplishment.331 That is, in reality, maybe people 
could assemble a sleeping bag, some vodka, and an oxygen tank into a 
bomb in order to escape a plane buried in an avalanche,332 but what people 
(most of whom are not genius scientists)333 probably would actually do in 
that situation is get comfortable in the sleeping bag, alternate between hits 
                                                                                                                          
324 Id. at 440; see also id. at 438 (“What unrelated private persons actually do is a much more 
limited universe than what they are theoretically able or permitted to do.”). 
325 Id. at 445 (footnote omitted). 
326 Id.  
327 Radios & Scanners: CB Radios, RADIO SHACK, https://www.radioshack.com/collections/cb-
radios [https://perma.cc/LK84-T8MS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
328 CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & CARY O’DELL, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
RADIO 150 (Routledge eds., 2010).  
329 Id.  
330 MacGyver – Premise, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacGyver#Premise (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
331 See MacGyver – Impact, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacGyver#Impact (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2017) (referencing “[t]he character’s ability to use everyday objects to perform 
extraordinary feats”). 
332 See Sam Greenspan, 11 Most Absurd Inventions Created by MacGyver, 11 POINTS (June 7, 
2011 11:00 AM), http://www.11points.com/TV/11_Most_Absurd_Inventions_Created_By_MacGyver 
[https://perma.cc/J2Z6-XNK6] (describing the episode “Gold Rush”).  
333 Angus MacGyver, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angus_MacGyver (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2017). 
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of vodka and pure, sweet oxygen, and quietly resign themselves to the 
looming inevitability of death. 
To cut to the chase: under Professor Henderson’s norms-based 
approach, if MacGyver had ever grabbed some common household items 
and built a side-channel device to spy on a suspected bad guy, a court 
applying the Kyllo test would not consider the resulting contraption to be 
“in general public use” no matter how quotidian its components.334  
This Article therefore proposes the following factors for courts to 
consider in determining whether a sense-enhancing device is “in general 
public use,” building upon the LaFleur and Henderson models: How much 
does it cost? How easy is it to get (i.e., can people buy it at Radio Shack, or 
from Amazon or eBay)? Is it legal to own and use? Is it common among 
the general public? If not, is it common within an established niche market 
or community, and how aware is the general public of that niche use? How 
much assembly is required to use the device, and how common are its 
components? These considerations should be evaluated in totality to 
determine whether the technology at issue is “in general public use,” with 
the fundamental factors of cost, availability, and legality being accorded 
the most weight. 
2. Is Side-Channel Attack Equipment “in General Public Use”? 
Finally, let us apply the “general public use” factors suggested above 
to side-channel attack equipment.  
For starters, Kyllo, with its thermal-imaging devices (which measure 
side-channel information about a home’s relative warmth), would probably 
come out differently today. Writing in 2002, LaFleur predicted that 
thermal-imaging devices like the one in Kyllo would one day be found on 
the shelves at Radio Shack (unless restricted by law), and that thermal-
imaging technology “might be found not to be a search” if the same fact 
pattern in Kyllo were decided now.335 Fully seven years ago, Professor 
Kerr opined that this state of affairs had indeed come to pass.336 
A more recent real-world case is also instructive, though it did not 
                                                                                                                          
334 Outside the context of side-channel attacks, an ingenious “one-off” MacGyver device might be 
deemed “in general public use” if it is a stand-in for an existing device that is undeniably in general 
public use, such as a defibrillator. See Greenspan, supra note 332 (describing the episode “The Enemy 
Within”).  
335 LaFleur, supra note 281, at 945 (emphasis added). 
336 In 2010, Professor Kerr wrote in a blog post that thermal imaging devices had become so 
widely available, at such an affordable price point, that a contemporary court applying the Kyllo rule 
might no longer come out the same way the Supreme Court had in 2001. Orin Kerr, Can the Police 
Now Use Thermal Imaging Devices Without a Warrant? A Reexamination of Kyllo in Light of the 
Widespread Use of Infrared Temperature Sensors, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 4, 2010 12:33 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/01/04/can-the-police-now-use-thermal-imaging-devices-without-a-warrant-a-
reexamination-of-kyllo-in-light-of-the-widespread-use-of-infrared-temperature-sensors/ 
[https://perma.cc/5GZP-TP5A]. 
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actually apply Kyllo. In United States v. Stanley, law enforcement agents 
used a software/hardware equipment combination to track down a 
suspected child pornography offender.337 Called the “MoocherHunter,” the 
software/equipment combination “is a mobile tracking software tool that 
can be downloaded for free from the manufacturer’s website and used by 
anyone with a laptop computer and a directional antenna” to track down 
the wireless card of a computer that is “mooching” off a wifi signal.338 The 
government did not contend that the “MoocherHunter” was technology “in 
general public use” under Kyllo.339  
The Third Circuit did not question that position, because it declined to 
apply the Kyllo “general public use” test.340 If we do so, then, applying the 
“in general public use” factors outlined above, cost favors an “in general 
public use” finding. The software was free, and a directional antenna can 
be ordered online for around $50.341 Likewise availability: the software 
was available for download, laptops are everywhere, and directional 
antennas are common enough. However, the fact that MoocherHunter was 
developed for law enforcement use342 cuts the other way, apparently 
dispositively. The general public is probably not aware of this niche 
software tool for the law enforcement community. Thus, while a laptop 
                                                                                                                          
337 753 F.3d 114, 115–17 (3d Cir. 2014). 
338 Id. at 116. The court used the term “MoocherHunter” to refer collectively to the software and 
the equipment using it. Id. at 116 n.5. While wifi signal emissions can be considered side-channel 
information, the government’s use of MoocherHunter was not a side-channel attack per se. 
339 Id. at 119. Before using the MoocherHunter, state and federal government agents discussed 
whether to obtain a warrant, and decided not to, both out of practical considerations and the distinctions 
they drew between the MoocherHunter and Kyllo. Id. at 117. 
340 Id. at 119–20. Instead, the court concluded that by intentionally sharing contraband child 
pornography online using his neighbor’s wifi connection, “Stanley deliberately ventured beyond the 
privacy protections of the home, and thus, beyond the safe harbor provided by Kyllo.” Id. (citation 
omitted). This has led Stanley to be criticized as wrongly decided. See Andersen, supra note 298, at 2–
3. Professor Kerr, by contrast, considers Stanley to be correctly decided under the third-party doctrine. 
Orin Kerr, United States v. Stanley and the Fourth Amendment Implications of Using 
“Moocherhunter” To Locate the User of An Unsecured Wireless Network, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Nov. 19, 2012 10:48 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/11/19/united-states-v-stanley-and-the-fourth-
amendment-implications-of-using-moocherhunter-to-locate-the-user-of-an-unsecured-wireless-
network/ [https://perma.cc/TYP3-J3P3]. 
341 E.g., Yagi WiFi Antenna 2.4GHz Outdoor Directional 14d, SIMPLEWIFI, 
http://www.simplewifi.com/yagi-wifi-antenna-2-4ghz-outdoor-directional-14d.html (last visited Apr. 
10, 2017) (selling for $54.00). [https://perma.cc/HR4L-U2FA] The Stanley opinion does not specify 
what make and model of directional antenna was used. However, in a MoocherHunter demonstrational 
video, the software’s developers use an antenna that appears highly similar to the $54 white Yagi 
antenna. Id. See The OSWA-Assistant(tm), THINKSECURE, http://securitystartshere.org/page-training-
oswa-assistant.htm#moocherhunter [https://perma.cc/3NPB-BTT7] (embedded video displays 
directional antenna starting at approximately 13:40 minutes) (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
342 See MoocherHunter 0.9.0.8, TECHSPOT, http://www.techspot.com/downloads/6215-
moocherhunter.html [https://perma.cc/R3RS-BXZK] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (stating that 
MoocherHunter is Singaporean software originally presented to the Southeast Asian law enforcement 
community in 2008).  
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and a directional antenna are affordable, available, and legal, once they 
were combined with obscure software for police use, the government in 
Stanley did not try to argue that the overall MoocherHunter 
hardware/software combination was in general public use. 
Next, reviewing the key-extraction techniques discussed in Section I 
above, some would not fare well under a Kyllo analysis informed by 
Stanley and the “in general public use” factors suggested above. This is 
due to cost. The Genkin team’s through-the-wall EM key-extraction attack 
used an antenna that costs 500 euro—expensive enough to put that attack 
in the “not in general public use” category.343 Likewise, the “portable” 
microphone set-up the team used to enhance the range of their RSA key-
extraction attack was lab-grade equipment344 too expensive and specialized 
to be “in general public use.” Those attacks require a warrant under Kyllo. 
But otherwise, the Genkin team made it a point to use cheap hardware 
components that can be ordered off eBay or scavenged from equipment 
already in one’s possession.345 The expensive “portable” set-up for the 
RSA key-extraction attack can be substituted by a variation that uses just a 
mobile phone (though the attack then works only up to 30 centimeters).346 
And in the case of the “pita bread” attack, the team developed an 
alternative to the pita bread set-up that requires only a regular household 
radio, plus an audio recorder to record the signal output.347  
The mobile-phone and consumer-radio set-ups check off the crucial 
cost, availability, and legality boxes—they are common among the general 
public—and they minimize the “some assembly required” factor.348 A 
mobile phone, “innocuously place[d] . . . on the desk next to the target 
                                                                                                                          
343 See ECDH Key-Extraction, supra note 43, at 11 (specifying use of Aaronia Magnetic Direction 
Finder MDF 9400 antenna); Magnetic Antenna MDF 9400, AARONIA, http://www.aaronia.com/
products/antennas/MDF-9400/ [https://perma.cc/T6GU-A3UU] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (giving list 
price of €499.95 on manufacturer’s website).  
344 See RSA Key Extraction, supra note 41, at 10 (describing a portable setup with a Brüel & Kjær 
model 4190 microphone capsule, model 2669 preamplifier, and model 5935 microphone power 
supply). At the time of this writing, a kit comprising the Brüel & Kjær 4190 and 2669 was for sale used 
on eBay for $990, and a used 5935 for around $350. Bruel Kjaer 4190 + 2669 BK B&K free field 
microphone preamp kit, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/itm/Bruel-Kjaer-4190-2669-BK-B-K-free-field-
microphone-preamp-kit-/182733184678 [https://perma.cc/B3XH-GPKH] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017); 
Bruel & Kjaer 5935 Dual Input Microphone Preamp, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/itm/Bruel-Kjaer-
5935-Dual-Input-Microphone-Preamp-/302402783935?epid=2156001266 (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
345 ECDSA Key Extraction, supra note 42, at 1, 15–16; STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, 
at 4 (attack “us[ed] simple and readily available equipment” or, in the alternative, “a common, 
consumer-grade radio,” again “avoid[ing] the expensive equipment used in prior attacks”).  
346 RSA Key Extraction, supra note 41, at 10–11, 27.  
347 STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, at 22–23. The pita bread set-up itself did not 
require anything expensive or hard to obtain; it used a software-defined radio (SDR) dongle, id. at 14, 
21, which is arguably cheap and available enough to be, taken alone, “in general public use.” See 
Woodward, supra note 23 (noting that SDRs cost less than £30). 
348 All of the equipment the team used in the various attacks is presumably legal to own, 
otherwise the researchers might have thought twice about talking about it in a series of published 
papers. 
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laptop” in order to secretly measure its EM emissions,349 would likely 
qualify under Kyllo as a “sense-enhancing” device that is “in general 
public use.” Therefore, a court might rule that police need not get a warrant 
to conduct that particular key-extraction attack in that particular manner. A 
court might well reach the same conclusion as to the attack that requires 
only a consumer-grade radio and an audio recorder.350 
The Genkin team’s research demonstrates that side-channel attack 
equipment can potentially “pass” the Kyllo “general public use” test if law 
enforcement repurposes common items, such as a cell phone or radio, to 
new, surveillance-oriented purposes—without even having to “MacGyver” 
a bunch of parts together.  
For perspective, repurposing common household items on the cheap to 
do a side-channel attack is a thirty-year-old strategy. Wim van Eck’s 
TEMPEST-style attack against a monitor (now popularly named after him) 
cost him $15 in equipment and a regular TV set in 1985.351 A side-channel 
attack involving “van Eck phreaking” of a target’s computer monitor 
almost certainly would not require a warrant under the Kyllo “general 
public use” test in 2017. Indeed, LaFleur, writing back in 2002, believed 
that the Kyllo ruling would likely extend to a TEMPEST-style attack using 
a device that “is completely passive and detects the modulated 
electromagnetic emissions from the [computer’s] keyboard or display” 
from a vantage point outside the building.352  
It may seem like a surprising outcome that some side-channel attacks 
do not require a warrant. In practice, a court might prove reluctant to allow 
“technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”353 in the electronic 
devices that hold so many details of our lives. Few laypeople have 
probably heard of side-channel cryptanalysis, so allowing the warrantless 
use of an “in general public use” cell phone or household radio, repurposed 
into “sense-enhancing technology” to extract private encryption keys from 
a laptop, may be a bridge too far. Applying Professor Henderson’s “social 
norms” factor, people could repurpose a phone or radio into surveillance 
devices, but that is not what people actually do. The court might be 
tempted to reject the application of the Kyllo test, as the Third Circuit did 
in Stanley, and resort to the classic Katz inquiry. If the court “ask[s] 
whether people reasonably expect” that their computers’ electromagnetic 
                                                                                                                          
349 RSA Key Extraction, supra note 41, at 5–6. 
350 STEALING KEYS FROM PCS, supra note 40, at 22–23. 
351 van Eck, supra note 17, at 270; see also Christopher J. Seline, Eavesdropping on the 
Compromising Emanations of Electronic Equipment: The Laws of England and the United States, 23 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (1991) (putting the price point for “see[ing] what someone is typing 
on their computer screen from several hundred yards away” at under $200 in “easily-available parts” in 
an article published ten years before the Kyllo decision). 
352 LaFleur, supra note 281, at 948.  
353 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 1450 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1393 
emissions “will be recorded” and analyzed “in a manner that enables the 
government to ascertain, more or less at will,”354 their private keys (and 
thus the plaintext of their private information), then the government’s 
warrantless use of a side-channel key-recovery attack might be held not to 
pass constitutional muster.  
Professor Henderson’s “social norms” factor was not expressly 
included in the Supreme Court’s formulation of the Kyllo rule, but it may 
be required to reconcile Kyllo with Katz’s “reasonable expectation” 
yardstick in order to avoid a result many would consider absurd. A 
straightforward inquiry into whether a device is “in general public use” 
that does not account for a non-standard use of that technology may be too 
“mechanical [an] interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.”355 Thus, to the 
Kyllo “general public use” factors listed above, it may be necessary to add 
yet another: If the device itself is in general public use, has it been 
modified or otherwise used in a non-standard manner? That is, is the use 
not a “general public use”? Adding that element would tilt the Kyllo factors 
more decisively toward the conclusion that, for each of the clever side-
channel attack equipment set-ups discussed above, the device is not in 
general public use and thus requires a warrant when employed by police. 
F. The Katz/Kyllo Framework Cannot Adequately Protect Privacy Against 
Advances in Law Enforcement Technology 
Kyllo attempted to announce a rule the Court anticipated could be 
applied flexibly to unknown future technologies without compromising 
traditional privacy interests. In practice, however, this rule guaranteed that 
evolving technologies would gradually eat away at privacy over time.  
The very possibility that a court might hold that the mobile-phone and 
household-radio attacks (or a van Eck phreaking attack) do not need a 
warrant illustrates a shortcoming of the Kyllo test and of the Katz approach 
more generally. Kyllo’s “not in general public use” rule was the Court’s 
strategy for preserving longstanding expectations of privacy against the 
encroachment of modern technology. The Court chose not to draw a line at 
a particular level of technological sophistication or complexity (which was 
wise), but rather, to focus on the technology’s obscurity.  
This makes intuitive sense under the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test, yet at the same time it highlights a notorious difficulty of that 
test. What is considered objectively reasonable changes over time, as 
societal norms shift and technology progresses.356 Under Katz and Kyllo, 
                                                                                                                          
354 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
355 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35. 
356 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the Katz test assumes people 
have “a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those 
expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in 
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the bar for government action to comport with the Fourth Amendment is 
gradually lowered, as once-wondrous inventions become humdrum357—
and people resign themselves to the lessening of their privacy.358  
This approach does not square with encryption’s vital role in the 
twenty-first century. Millions of Americans now use encryption to protect 
the security and privacy of their electronic devices and data from snoops, 
hackers, thieves, and other criminals—giving those bad actors an incentive 
to devise new methods for undermining cryptographic protections. Under 
the Katz/Kyllo framework, the proliferation of devices for bad actors to 
sidestep encryption would perversely result in the relaxation of the warrant 
requirement for seizures by the state. That is, the nefarious ingenuity of 
criminals would lessen the constitutional constraints placed on the very 
authorities charged with protecting us from them. 
Absent a better rule for limiting technology’s incursions on privacy, 
the eventual impact could be dire. “All human activity is susceptible to 
observation in the form of energy reflection or emanation that is readily 
captured and converted to ‘data.’”359 If the courts permit side-channel data 
about us to be “pervasively captured, stored, and integrated with other 
data” by police without so much as a warrant, “individual privacy becomes 
a physical impossibility.”360 That is not the outcome the Kyllo Court 
intended—quite the contrary—but that is how it may play out, as long as 
Kyllo remains good law361 and the courts must continue to apply Katz to 
novel forms of non-trespassory surveillance.362  
CONCLUSION 
Once side-channel attacks make the eventual jump from military and 
intelligence to law enforcement use, judicial challenges to their 
constitutionality will soon follow. This Article illustrates the shortcomings 
of the present legal framework (such as it is) for seizure of encryption keys 
                                                                                                                          
flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”). 
357 See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“the same technological advances that have made 
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution 
of societal privacy expectations”) (citing id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
358 See id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if the public does not welcome the diminution of 
privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as 
inevitable.”) (footnote omitted). 
359 LaFleur, supra note 281, at 948. 
360 Id. 
361 “[G]iven the continued advancement of technology and reduction of cost in ‘old technology,’ 
the ‘in general public use’ doctrine may lose viability.” United States v. Vargas, No. 13-cr-6025, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, at *36 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) (citing Colin Shaff, Is the Court Allergic 
to Katz? Problems Posed by New Methods of Electronic Surveillance to the “Reasonable-Expectation-
of-Privacy” Test, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 409, 448 (2014)). 
362 Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). 
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by means of a side-channel attack.  
Side-channel attacks that law enforcement conducts against electronic 
devices located in a home or office are analyzed under the Kyllo 
framework. Because the Fourth Amendment strongly protects those spaces, 
obtaining side-channel information from devices inside them generally 
requires a warrant. However, Kyllo’s “general public use” rule opens up an 
exception. In time, that exception will permit the warrantless seizure of 
side-channel information from an otherwise constitutionally-protected 
space if the devices to do so become common enough. That rule is not a 
principled way to make a decision about the privacy protections for an 
encryption key, and the decision should not be left up to the courts. 
For side-channel attacks conducted in public spaces, Jones dictates that 
the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis applies. There is 
generally a reasonable expectation of privacy in our electronic devices and 
the information (including encryption keys) they contain. Therefore, the 
Fourth Amendment will typically require a warrant for the seizure of 
encryption keys via side-channel key-extraction attacks in public, as it does 
for the home. Similarly, however, that standard will be undermined if the 
Kyllo rule extends beyond the home context to non-trespassory 
surveillance of electronic devices in public spaces. 
In short, when it comes to cryptographic side-channel attacks, current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is ill-equipped to safeguard Americans’ 
privacy in the long term. What reform is most appropriate is beyond the 
scope of this Article. That said, anticipating the advent of cryptographic 
side-channel attacks by law enforcement presents a rare opportunity for us 
to shape the law now, rather than reacting to technological change after the 
fact. We would be well-advised not to waste that chance. 
 
